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Resumen
A pesar del esfuerzo de reformas de las décadas pasadas, el desempeño económico y social de los países de América Latina
durante los noventa fue bastante pobre. La excepción fue Chile, que creció a tasas promedio de 7% durante la mayor parte de
la década y redujo significativamente su tasa de pobreza. Este trabajo intenta explicar esta notable diferencia. Siguiendo la
literatura más reciente, que destaca el rol que juegan las instituciones y políticas en el crecimiento económico,
argumentamos que el mejor desempeño de Chile se debió a que las reformas implementadas fueron mucho más profundas y
abarcaron más áreas que aquellas  implementadas en otros países de América Latina. Durante este proceso Chile terminó con
fundamentos económicos más sólidos y, aún más importante, con mejores instituciones, lo que le permitió enfrentar de
mejor manera los shocks adversos en los noventa. Basados en un modelo econométrico de corte transversal estimado para el
período 1960-2000, argumentamos que el mejor desempeño de Chile vis-a-vis al resto de la región puede ser explicado en
partes iguales por las mejores instituciones y políticas del país (en contraste, el mejor desempeño de Asia del Este es
explicado principalmente por mejores políticas). Adicionalmente, estimamos que América Latina puede aumentar su tasa de
crecimiento anual del producto per cápita un 1,6%, en promedio, si tuviera la calidad de instituciones de Chile. Por otro lado,
si el promedio de los países de América Latina tuviera políticas (desarrollo financiero y sobrevaluación cambiaria) similares
a Chile, la tasa de crecimiento anual del producto per cápita aumentaría en un 1,0%, en promedio. Concluimos que, para
lograr tasas de crecimiento más altas, los países de América Latina deben avanzar en sus procesos de reformas y poner más
énfasis en el desarrollo y fortalecimiento de sus instituciones, las cuales, como muestra la experiencia de Chile, pueden ser
modificadas (aunque lentamente).
Abstract
Despite the reform effort of past decades, the economic and social performance of Latin American countries during the 1990s
was quite disappointing. The exception was Chile, which grew at a rate near 7% for most of the decade and reduced its
poverty rate quite significantly. This paper tries to explain this striking difference. Following the most recent literature that
highlights the role played by institutions and policies on growth, we argue that Chile’s better performance was due to the
country undertaking reforms that were much deeper and broader in scope than those in other Latin American countries. In the
process, Chile ended up with stronger macro fundamentals and, most important, better institutions, all of which allowed it to
face in a better way the adverse shocks of the 1990s. Based on a cross sectional econometric model estimated over the 1960-
2000 period, we argue that Chile’s better performance can be explained by the country’s better institutions and better policies
in equal shares (East Asia’s better performance, on the other hand, is explained mainly by better economic policies). In
addition, we estimate that by having institutions of quality similar to Chile’s, the average Latin American country could raise
its per-capita GDP growth rate by about 1.6%, on average. Similarly, by adopting policies (financial development and RER
overvaluation) similar to Chile’s, the average Latin American country could raise its per capita GDP growth rate in about
1.0%, on average. We conclude that, in order to attain higher growth, Latin American countries should move forward in their
reform processes and put more emphasis on building and strengthening their institutions, which, based on Chile’s experience,
can be modified (albeit slowly).
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I. Introduction
Latin American countries grew steadily at about 5% per year in the three decades
after World War II. But this process did not last as it was interrupted by the debt crisis of
the early 1980s, during which most countries in the region went into recession (table 1).
The crisis brought to the surface the structural problems, both macro and micro, existing in
most Latin American economies. Consequently, almost every country in the region spent
the rest of the decade revising and amending their policies and implementing reforms
aimed at fostering growth and changing the development model followed until then.
Following the debt crisis, the old import-substitution cum government intervention
model began to be replaced by market-oriented economies where resource allocation was to
be driven mainly by private initiative and market forces. Thus, during the second part of the
1980s –the so-called lost decade–, Latin American countries, one after another, began
dismantling tariffs and other trade barriers, reducing fiscal deficits, fighting inflation,
liberalizing prices and interest rates, lifting credit restrictions, privatizing state owned
enterprises, and reducing government intervention in the economy. The aim was to foster
market competition and to achieve greater integration with the rest of the world, both in
goods & services and in financial flows. In the new development model the government
was supposed to play a complementary role and focus its attention only on the provision of
public goods and the institutional build up –e.g. public safety, legal system, regulatory and
supervisory framework– and provide basic services to the poor –health care and education.
Expectations were that by adopting the new model and implementing the policies
recommended by the International Financial Institutions —the so wrongly called
Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2003)— countries would start growing again on a
sustained basis. Social indicators would improve across the board and income inequality
would be reduced.
After a decade of reforms, economic growth resumed, but the overall outcome fell
short of expectations: average growth during the 1990s, for the region as a whole, attained
3.3% and has since remained below the average of the three decades after WW II. Further,
the region was not immune to crises (Mexico 1994-95, Ecuador 1999, Argentina 2001) and
was also adversely affected by the 1997-98 financial turmoil. In addition, although there
was an improvement in social indicators like literacy or infant mortality, the drop in
poverty was very marginal, and the per capita income gap with industrial countries
broadened in most countries. These results have been the cause of disillusionment with, and
the so-called fatigue of, the reform process.
The exception to all of the above was Chile. The country not only grew steadily
during thirteen years after the debt crisis at a much higher rate than in previous decades —
annual growth during 1985-97 averaged 7.3%—, but did not suffer severe economic crises
during this period and was only mildly affected by the turmoil of the late 1990s. And
although growth averaged only 2.7% during 1998-2003, it is expected to return to around
6%
1 in 2004-2005. In addition, during the 1990s the inflation rate fell to single digits, social
indicators –except for income distribution– improved significantly (poverty fell by as much
                                                          
1    Growth actually reached 6.1% in 2004 and is expected to be between 5.25% and 6.25% in 2005.-2-
as 16 percentage points) and the per capita income gap with industrial countries was
reduced by about 30%.
The contrasting experience of Chile vis-a-vis the rest of the region has not gone
unnoticed. In fact, many researchers and policymakers have searched for explanations and,
in the process, pointed out to specific factors that distinguish Chile from the rest of the
region. Potential candidates among these factors include the depth and extent of the reform
process –Chile started its reform in the mid-1970s, about a decade earlier than Mexico, the
second country to begin reforms. The pension system reform of the early 1980s has also
been singled out as an explanation as it provides a large savings base and reduces the
country’s dependency on foreign savings to finance investment. And some have argued that
capital controls played a role –especially the so-called encaje (unremunerated reserve
requirement)– during the 1990s, when private flows returned to the region, because they
reduced the country’s dependency on short-term and volatile flows, thus making it less
prone to capital flight and contagion effects.
2
Although all the factors above have most likely played a role, there is at least one
complementary explanation for the different economic performance of Chile and the other
Latin American countries. This is based on the most recent literature on economic growth
that suggests that the ultimate cause of a country’s growth lies on the quality of its
institutions. Better institutions –property rights protection, governance, lack of corruption
and bureaucracy, rule of law, and the like– lead to the design of better policies, and enhance
the support, credibility and effectiveness of implemented policies, therefore, allowing
countries to attain faster economic growth. Thus, the argument follows, Chile has been able
to grow faster than other Latin American countries since the mid- 1980s, although facing
the same external environment and shocks, mainly thanks to its better institutions.
This paper attempts to evaluate the statement above. That is, we try to find an
explanation for Chile’s different performance since the mid-1980s, with a focus on
quantifying –to the extent possible by data availability– the contribution of different
factors. We find that, as expected, both policies and the quality of the country’s institutions
influenced the outcome in terms of growth. However, the two sets of factors differ in their
relative contribution. For instance, our results show that the higher economic growth of
East Asia during the 1990s is explained mainly by the better economic policies pursued by
that region. More precisely, using our econometric model to predict the in-sample annual
per-capita GDP growth, we find that about 75% of the faster economic growth in East Asia
vis-a-vis Latin America is due to better policies and only 25% to better institutions. In
contrast, better policies and better institutions explain Chile’s better performance during the
1990s, vis-à-vis Latin America, in almost equal shares. The model predicts that during the
1990s per-capita GDP in Chile grew annually by about 2.4% more than in the rest of Latin
America, and about half of it is explained by better policies and half by better institutions.
With regards to economic policies, we find that financial development fosters economic
growth, while that supporting an overvalued real exchange rate is consistently detrimental
to growth.
                                                          
2     It should be noted that while there exists a consensus on the benefits of pension reform, there is not such a
consensus on the effectiveness and efficiency of capital controls. See Gallego and Hernández (2003) and
references therein.-3-
This paper is an attempt to put together the conclusions of two branches of the
literature, one that studies and draw policy lessons from the reform process in Latin
America (IDB 1997; Lora 2001; Fernandez-Arias and Montiel 1997), and another that tries
to explain economic growth using large data sets, in either a cross sectional or panel
framework, which has lately emphasized the role of institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001;
Rodrik et al., 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003). Using Chile as a counterfactual, we are
able to quantify the benefits –in terms of increased economic growth– to be reaped-off by
other Latin American countries of adopting better policies and improving the quality of
their institutions.
At least two policy conclusions emerge from our analysis. First, countries that are
behind in the reform process compared to, say, Chile or Mexico that started earlier, can
benefit and attain higher economic growth if they continue making progress in the so-called
first generation reforms. Second, beyond economic reforms, countries would benefit by
improving their institutions, which by nature are much more persistent but, nevertheless,
can be changed, as countries are not condemned to live with the institutions inherited from
previous generations. This means that countries should not cease in their efforts to reform
their institutional setup, even though the benefits materialize much later than in the case of
economic policies, because the payoff is quite large. Institutional buildup should be a
continuos effort, like it has been in Chile that for over three decades has been reforming its
institutions and continues doing so. In fact, several reforms affecting the judiciary system,
the electoral system and other institutions —some of which even require amendments to the
country’s Constitution— are underway at the time of writing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly describes the reform
process in Latin America in the past 25 years, highlighting the areas where most and least
progress has been made. Section III summarizes the economic and social performance of
Latin American economies since World War II. By going over a set of economic and social
indicators, this section establishes that Chile performed relatively well compared to other
countries in almost every dimension, except for income distribution. Based on previous
work by others, section IV evaluates the reforms implemented in the region, that is, it
provides an overall assessment of what did and did not work. Section V looks into Chile’s
reforms in greater detail. After comparing the initial conditions in the early 1990s, it
advances an explanation of Chile’s better performance by analyzing in detail the existing
differences in both policies and quality of institutions between Chile and the rest of the
region. Next, section VI quantifies the relative contribution to economic growth of each set
of factors –policies and quality of institutions. By explaining economic growth on a
quantitative basis, this section provides an assessment of the potential benefits that a typical
Latin American country would obtain from improving its institutional set-up and advancing
in the economic reform process. Finally, section VII discusses the challenges ahead for
most countries in the region and advances some policy conclusions. Section VIII
summarizes and concludes.
II. Economic Reform in Latin America: Where Do We Stand?
The Latin American region, which grew steadily at about 5% per year during the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s, was severely hit by the debt crisis of the early 1980s. Almost-4-
every country, and especially the largest —Argentina, Brazil and Mexico—, borrowed
heavily during the period of high liquidity in the international capital markets that followed
the oil price shock of the early 1970s. Thus, after running large current account deficits for
a few years, these countries were severely affected when monetary policy shifted in the US
and international interest rates were raised causing a global slowdown (table 1).
The crisis uncovered the major imbalances and structural problems that existed in
most countries in the region at the time, setting the stage for the reform process that
occurred the following years. The reforms were aimed first at attaining macroeconomic
stability and reducing government deficits. Beyond that, the main goal was to replace the
old import substitution cum government intervention development model that had been in
place for several decades. Instead, countries opted for developing outward oriented
economies where market forces, as opposed to government actions, would play a major role
in allocating resources among competing sectors.
Starting with Mexico in the mid 1980s, one after another Latin American countries
began implementing the same reforms that Chile had introduced in 1974-75 and thereafter.
These included a program to reestablish macro stability, comprising a devaluation of the
currency, a tightening of monetary policy and a fiscal adjustment with significant cuts in
subsidies and non-essential programs. The aim was threefold: to reduce the fiscal deficit, to
balance the external accounts and to fight inflation.
In addition, countries began reducing both the level and the dispersion of trade tariffs,
while lifting other non-tariff barriers to trade and unifying multiple exchange rate systems.
Trade integration took two forms; some countries opted for unilateral tariff reductions –like
Chile had done in the 1970s– while others preferred trade agreements and the establishment
of trade areas within the region, like Mercosur which in its first stage included only four
countries, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. Also, countries implemented
tax reforms whereby the VAT was introduced —Chile introduced the VAT in 1975— and
some taxes were raised to compensate for the reductions in trade tariffs.
The reform process comprised three other areas, namely, financial liberalization,
privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs), and the labor market. Financial sector
reforms included lifting restrictions on credit allocation, abolishing ceilings on interest
rates, and reducing reserve requirements on banks. The aim was to end the era of financial
repression so that credit could be allocated to its most productive and profitable uses among
competing economic sectors. In addition, state owned banks were privatized to improve
their efficiency. Similarly, the privatization of SOEs sought to attract more investment and
attain higher levels of efficiency in the use of resources. Along the way, the privatization of
banks and enterprises would provide extraordinary funds for the government that would
help to resolve debt problems. Finally, labor market reforms were aimed at increasing labor
mobility and wage flexibility. Main objectives were to reduce the cost of firing by cutting
severance payments and to abolish automatic salary adjustments to past inflation.
As mentioned, the goals of the reforms were to reestablish macro stability and to
replace the old development model that was based on import substitution and widespread
government intervention in the economy. The latter occurred through price and exchange
controls, mandatory credit allocation, financial repression and subsidies to specific
industries, among other measures, and was the cause of governments running large fiscal-5-
deficits, high inflation rates and endemic balance of payments deficits. In addition, labor
legislation was overprotective and tended to reduce mobility and flexibility.
In the new market oriented development model the government relinquishes from the
production and distribution of private goods that can be produced more efficiently by the
private sector. Instead, it focuses on the provision of public goods –e.g. safety, judiciary
system– and, most importantly, implementing social programs to alleviate poverty and
improve the access of the poor to basic services such as health care and education. But in
the new model, education and health care services do not have to be provided necessarily
by the government; the poor, with financial support from the government, can buy the
services from a private provider. In addition, in the new model the government does play a
crucial role in market regulation and supervision. This comprises not only the financial
sector and public utilities –which in many cases were privatized–, but markets in general.
The aim is to develop and maintain a competitive environment in all industries and sectors,
and entails setting rates for natural monopolies such as utilities, strengthening the role of
consumer protection agencies, promoting market discipline and assuring free entry to all
economic sectors.
Although the breadth and timing of the reform processes differ across countries, it is
worth trying to assess the degree of progress achieved throughout the region. As said, Chile
made significant progress in several areas in the 1970s (few other countries did so in some
areas), but the bulk of the reforms in the region were implemented after the debt crisis.
Figure 1 shows indicators of progress made in several areas as well as an indicator of
progress made in general. All indicators are constructed to measure progress made since
1985. Although these indicators are subject to many caveats
3, they are indicative of the
reform effort in the region as a whole. The figure shows that much progress occurred in
trade liberalization, especially up to the tequila crisis, and significant progress occurred in
the financial sector, although it was more evenly spanned through time
4. Conversely, little
progress has been made in tax reform and in the privatization of state owned enterprises,
and no progress at all in the labor market. Thus, a lot remains to be done in Latin America
in the last three areas.
III. Latin America’s Economic and Social Performance
In the past 43 years, Latin America’s economic performance has varied significantly
from one period to another, in contrast to the experience of East Asia. Further, on average
Latin America grew at about half the rate of East Asia for the whole 1960-2002 period, and
has not yet recovered the rates of growth attained in the 1960s and 1970s, despite the
recovery witnessed shortly into the reform process (figure 2).
Among all Latin American countries, Chile is the only one that in the past eighteen
years has grown at average rates comparable to those attained by the East Asian economies.
Chile’s growth rate in 1990-2000 was very similar to that of South Korea, and was between
South Korea’s and Indonesia’s in 1985-97. Costa Rica, the Latin American country that
                                                          
3 The indices measure, for each area, how liberalized is each country compared to the least and most
liberalized country in the whole sample. The sample period is 1985-99 in Lora (2001) and 1970-95 in
Morley et al. (1999). For more details see Lora, 2001; Lora and Barrera 1997; and Morley et al., 1999.
4 According to Morley et al., significant progress also occurred up to 1995 in the opening of the capital
account.-6-
comes second after Chile in terms of growth during 1985-97, grew at a much lower rate –
about 2.5% less per year (table 2).
Consequently, among all Latin American countries Chile is the only one that, along
with the emerging market economies from East Asia, in the past quarter century has closed
its per-capita GDP gap with the industrial countries —Chile closed this gap in about 30%
(figure 3).
Chile’s good performance also shows up in its social indicators. Life expectancy
increased sharply in the past 42 years and as of 2001 was the region’s second highest after
Costa Rica. Similarly, after falling by more than 91% since 1960, in 2001 infant mortality
was the region’s second lowest after Costa Rica and has continued falling since; at 7.8 per
1000 live births one year later it was lower than Costa Rica’s. And at 96%, the literacy rate
is the third highest in the region after Argentina and Uruguay, although both these countries
had a relatively high rate (93%) thirty years ago (table 3). But all Latin American countries,
albeit to a lesser degree, showed improvements in these indicators.
The most outstanding achievement in the case of Chile has been poverty reduction; in
the past 10 years the country has halved its poverty rate —it went from 33% in the early
1990s, down to 17% in 2000 (table 4). In contrast, poverty reduction in the region at large
has been modest —from 41% to 36%— while in some countries it has increased. It is worth
noting that according to Attanassio and Székely (2001), about 85 percent of the poverty
reduction in Chile can be attributed to high economic growth, while only 7 percent resulted
from redistribution policies.
5
The one area in which Chile has not been successful is in altering its income
distribution. Thus, not only income distribution deteriorated in Latin America in the past 30
years, becoming one of the worst in the world, but with a Gini coefficient above 0.55
Chile’s income distribution is one of the worst in the region (figures 4 and 5).
In sum, in the 1990s, economic growth resumed in the region but remained below the
pre-debt-crisis rates, widening the per-capita income gap with industrial countries. At the
same time, poverty reduction was modest, other social indicators improved and income
distribution worsened. In sharp contrast, Chile’s growth rate during the decade was one of
the highest around the world, becoming the only Latin America country that converged in
per-capita-income terms to the industrial countries. Hence, except for income distribution,
Chile’s social indicators improved significantly, placing it among the best in the region.
This brief revision of the economic and social performance of Latin American
economies raises several questions, in particular: Did the structural reforms implemented
during the 1980s and 1990s have any effect on countries’ performance? What did Chile do
differently that explains its better results? The next two sections try to answer these
questions by first summarizing previous findings and then exploring in greater detail the
reform process in Chile. Section IV provides an overall assessment of why Latin American
countries did not attain higher growth on a sustained basis, while Section V advances an
explanation of Chile’s better performance by analyzing in detail the differences with the
rest of the region in both policies and quality of institutions.
                                                          
5 The results from Attanassio and Székely (2001) refer to the drop in poverty between 1987 and 1996.
According to these authors, about 8% of the drop in poverty is a residual and cannot be explained by their
model.-7-
IV. The Reform Process and Its Results: An Assessment
Early attempts at evaluating the reform processes in Latin America concluded that
reforming countries reaped large benefits from them. The initial estimates concluded that
the reforms implemented in the region up to the mid-nineties accelerated growth by about
2% per year (Easterly et al., 1997; Fernández-Arias and Montiel, 1997). But these results
were subsequently contested by new analyses that looked into longer time series.
Nevertheless, more recent literature that revisits the issue concludes that the reforms
indeed contributed to accelerate growth, although the effects were rather transitory,
implying that to achieve a higher growth rate on a sustained basis countries should continue
the reform process. Thus, for instance, according to Lora and Panizza (2002) Latin America
grew about 1.3% faster during 1991-93 because of the reform effort, but only about 0.6%
faster in 1997-99 both because the effects of previous reforms faded away and because the
reform effort declined.
At least four other important conclusions emerge from the literature. First, results
were unsatisfactory in some countries because of an insufficient reform effort; in other
words, growth did not accelerate in those countries not because reforms failed, but because
they were incomplete, either in scope or in depth (Fernández-Arias and Montiel, 1997).
Second, the pay-off from the reforms depends on institutions. Thus, for instance, according
to Lora and Panizza (2002), reforms were more effective in countries with good rule of law.
Third, reforms are complementary; i.e., the pay-off from, say, trade reform —in terms of
faster economic growth— was higher in countries with a more developed financial sector
(Gallego and Loayza, 2002). And finally, reforms tend to affect growth mainly through
increases in total factor productivity, TFP, rather than through factor accumulation (Lora
and Panizza, 2002).
The four results above are consistent with each other if one notes that the main reason
that explains the difference in growth performance among countries in recent decades has
shifted from factor accumulation to TFP, that is, doing things better (not just doing more of
the same by hiring more labor and capital). This is illustrated in table 5 that shows the
decomposition of growth for the five-best and five-worst performers in Latin America in
the past four decades. It is clear from the table that differences in growth during the 1960s
and 1970s were due mainly to faster capital accumulation. In contrast, the best performers
in the 1980s and 1990s achieved faster growth because of larger increases in TPF. Beyer
and Vergara (2002), who decompose the growth of a much larger (107) sample of countries
during 1980-2000, reach a similar conclusion. They conclude that about 82 percent of the
growth difference between the 10%-best and the 10%-worst performers can be explained
by changes in TFP, while only 18% is explained by faster factor accumulation
6.
                                                          
6 It is possible to provide a different interpretation of the results in table 5. In particular, given the way we
computed the contribution to growth of ∆L, ∆K and ∆TFP, the latter element captures not only efficiency
gains but also other unidentified shocks (“bad or good luck”). Therefore, it could be argued that the best
performers, those countries showing a higher contribution of ∆TFP, are those more resilient to shocks
(where negative shocks were less harmful). This resilience may, in turn, be a direct result of better
institutions and policies.-8-
In an era of rapid technological change, rapidly growing firms are constantly trying to
improve procedures and attain greater efficiency by incorporating and adapting new
technologies. For this to occur, a necessary condition is that prices reflect the actual cost of
providing different goods and services, which can be achieved by liberalizing prices and
implementing several other market-oriented policies. In other words, what is needed is to
reduce state intervention in the economy (except for externalities and other market failures
that require the state to intervene). But this is not enough. Also, the business environment
must be such that the private sector has the incentives to invest in the development and
implementation of new and better technologies; that is, the business environment must be
conducive to agents to get involved in constantly improving their efficiency levels. For this,
stable rules of the game and good institutions are needed. Among the latter are the rule of
law, property rights protection, no corruption, and low bureaucracy.
7
In sum, countries that do not put in place an adequate institutional setup, one that
supports investment in innovation and the adaptation of new technologies, will not reap the
benefits of attaining rapid economic growth even if other economic reforms take place,
such as trade liberalization or macro stability. Indeed, Fernández-Arias and Montiel (1997)
suggest that this is one front where most Latin American countries failed during the reform
process; not enough emphasis was put on building up and strengthening institutions. These
authors acknowledge that some countries did not even complete the so called first
generation reforms; i.e., fiscal and macro stability was not attained and trade liberalization
was never completed. In their view, completing the macroeconomic reforms that were
partially implemented would have bridged a significant part of the growth gap observed
during 1991-95 between East Asia and Latin America. And closing the educational gap that
exists between both regions would work in the same direction. But, in their words, “… we
suspect that it [the growth gap] is also associated with other deep-seated institutional and
structural differences in these economies as well. In any event, the gap suggests the need
for a broadening of the scope of reform in Latin America beyond the macroeconomic
sphere if the region’s economies are to achieve the standard of performance they seek”.
The next two sections of the paper address the issue raised by Fernandez-Arias and
Montiel (1997). In particular, we try to explain Chile’s better performance (described in
section III) on the country’s institutions and continuos reform process. Section V below
discusses the differences in policies and institutions between Chile and other Latin
American countries during the 1990s, and describes in greater detail Chile’s reform
process, while section VI provides empirical evidence supporting the view that policies and
institutions made a difference.
But before closing this section, a word should be said about the one area in which
Chile, like all other countries in the region, made no progress in the last decades: income
distribution. In this regard Birdsall and Székely (2003) conclude that, in general, policies to
redistribute income failed throughout the region, or were insufficient to compensate for the
regressive effects of other reforms like financial liberalization.
8 In fact, based on research
                                                          
7 Note that this explanation does not preclude the possibility that a better business environment may,
besides being more conducive to research and investment in innovation, lead to faster factor accumulation.
8 Financial liberalization allows people with good investment projects to make large profits, increasing their
wealth. But the poor usually don’t have access to formal financial markets and therefore cannot benefit
from this reform. In sum, financial liberalization offers new opportunities for those relatively well off as-9-
conducted by Attanasio and Székely (2001) they show that the bulk of the change in
poverty in the region was due to economic growth. In their sample there is only one Latin
American country where redistribution policies were highly effective: Brazil. In fact, up to
70 percent of the decrease in moderate poverty there between 1985 and 1995 can be
explained by income redistribution. The only problem is that this result was mainly at the
expense of those in extreme poverty; for this group, redistribution effects deteriorated their
relative position, more than offsetting the positive effect from economic growth (table 6).
The bottom line is that redistribution is no easy task and the best we can do to
alleviate poverty is to enhance growth and avoid crises. This way we can at least assure that
the poor (as well as the well off) will be better off. Further, crises are very harsh on the
poor; they suffer the most during recessions because they don’t have assets to compensate
for lost jobs, and employment recovers with a significant lag after the crisis is over.
Effective redistribution is hard to achieve because it entails giving the poor access to assets
that allow them to work their way out of poverty and protect them against the loss of
unskilled jobs during recessions. Two ways of doing this are to give them access to more
and better education, that is, investing more in human capital, and to grant them access to
credit to buy productive assets. But designing and implementing effective policies towards
these goals is not an easy task.
V. Why is Chile Different?
As it was explained in section III, with the exception of Chile Latin American
countries grew at relatively modest rates during the 1990s (table 2). In addition, a common
feature across the region has been the high macroeconomic volatility associated with
recurrent crises, which usually have fiscal roots and in some cases are even exacerbated by
financial problems. For example, Mexico, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela
suffered crises with deep output contractions during the 1990s (figure 6.1).
These recurrent macro crises among Latin American countries have delayed the
reform process and in many instances resulted in major setbacks. On the contrary, Chile did
not suffer a financial crisis during this period and (jointly with Mexico and Brazil) did not
experience a strong fall in output during the Asian and Russian crises. This has been so
partly because Chile’s fiscal problems were faced early on, culminating with a stringent
fiscal-responsibility rule, and partly because Chile counts with a very robust banking sector.
In the following paragraphs we attempt to explain this difference between Chile and
the rest of the Latin American countries.
V.1 Initial Conditions
Many country experiences show the importance of both economic policies and
institutions in attaining high growth rates. With regards to economic policies,
macroeconomic stability is a must; countries that do not achieve macro stability are prone
                                                                                                                                                                                
opposed to the poor; it redistributes (opportunities) in favor of the wealthier. The policy conclusion is to
create special mechanisms to improve access to credit to small enterprises, for example by guarantying the
credits of those that lack enough collateral.-10-
to suffer costly crises where the poorest groups suffer the most. In order to assure macro
stability it is necessary to have control over inflation, fiscal discipline and a macroeconomic
policy framework (exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policy) that is internally consistent
and robust to different scenarios.
Macro Stability
 Regarding macroeconomic stability, inflation control was the most notable success
of the stabilization and reform programs of the 1990s in Latin America, in stark contrast to
the region’s long history of high inflation and sporadic bouts of hyperinflation. At the end
of the 1980s, average regional inflation hit nearly 500 percent, and given the high
economic, social and political cost of this situation, strong public consensus emerged to
reduce inflation rates to lower levels. Most Latin American countries, especially those with
a past record of hyperinflation, initially chose to desinflate through exchange rate-based
stabilization plans
9. Although the choice of firmness of the different exchange rate
arrangements varied across countries, ranging from a currency board (Argentina, 1991) to
crawling pegs, the general strategy yielded impressive reductions in inflation (table 7).
Countries that opted for more flexible exchange rate systems (for example, Chile) tended to
experience more gradual reductions in inflation, although they had relatively lower initial
rates of inflation. By the end of the 1990s, few countries had inflation rates of over 10
percent, and the regional average had dropped to around 10 percent. The gains in inflation
control have proved to be enduring, even when exchange rate-based stabilization plans
ultimately became unsustainable
10.
One central problem among Latin American economies has been the difficulty in
credibly ensuring sustainable fiscal policies, which has led to recurrent crises with fiscal
roots. Examples over the past decade are Mexico (1994-95), Ecuador (1999), Brazil (1999
and 2002), Argentina (2001) and Uruguay (2002). While the relative importance of
domestic policy problems versus external developments in explaining these crises is a
matter of debate, it is clear in retrospect that these economies were not sufficiently “crisis-
proof” to weather the global shocks that materialized in the 1990s. Indeed, most of the
region during the 1990s continued showing pro-cyclicality in fiscal policies that contributed
to macroeconomic volatility and reduced resilience to external shocks. In contrast, under
similar external circumstances Chile since the mid 1980s has followed generally sound
fiscal policies and avoided financial crises. With the exception of Chile during the 1990s,
Latin American countries experienced high fiscal deficits that translated into raising debt
ratios, even when economic conditions were good (table 8 and figure 6.2). Furthermore, the
lack of credibility led to an increasing reliance on dollar-denominated or CPI-indexed debt,
leaving debt stocks vulnerable to suffer sharp jumps in the face of financial turmoil and
movements in the real exchange rate.
                                                          
9   Given that monetary anchors had failed to control inflation in the past, exchange rates were viewed as a
more effective anchor that would introduce credibility to policy, which central banks lacked under a more
discretionary framework.
10   The exchange rate-based stabilization programs did not suffice to discipline other policies needed for its
support and sustainability through time, such as prudent fiscal policies, price and wage flexibility, and
trade deepening.-11-
A related issue was the effect that overvalued real exchange rates had on the medium-
term burden associated with foreign-currency denominated debt. Real exchange rates
tended to appreciate sharply when price stabilization was achieved using exchange-rate
anchors. The real exchange rate appreciation, in turn, tended to reduce the value of the
foreign-currency denominated debt in relation to GDP, thus contributing to a belated
recognition of the true magnitude of the fiscal problem, which only became apparent when
exchange rates eventually adjusted downward. In Argentina, for instance, almost all of the
65-percentage points increase in the public debt/GDP ratio in 2002, was due to the
exchange rate correction. Countries that adopted inflation objectives like Chile, Peru and




As we said, macroeconomic crises in Latin America usually had fiscal roots and in
some cases were exacerbated by financial problems. During the 1990s, banking system
fragilities contributed to a series of crises that spurred restructuring and reform efforts. A
first wave of crises hit several Latin American countries during the mid-1990s, starting in
1994 with Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, and followed by Argentina and
Paraguay in 1995 and Ecuador in 1996. Banks were restructured and/or recapitalized, often
at a great fiscal cost, while regulatory systems were overhauled. In many cases the reforms
were successful in strengthening banking systems and averting banking crises when
domestic or external shocks hit again. In others, however, reforms were less successful and
a second wave of crisis hit several banking systems, including in Ecuador in 1999,
Argentina in 2001, Uruguay in 2002 and the Dominican Republic in 2003. In sharp
contrast, Chile had not financial crises during the 1990s, because, as opposed to other
countries in the region, its financial system is one of the largest and its banking system one
of the strongest among emerging markets economies. (figures 6.3 and 6.4).
There is a growing consensus in the theoretical and empirical literature about the
importance of financial development in fostering economic growth (Levine, 1997, 2004).
However, with the exception of Chile, Latin American countries have less developed
financial systems than other developing countries, even less developed than other
economies with a similar income level (IDB, 2004). Latin American financial systems are
still largely bank-based, with securities markets mostly small and illiquid.
12 In this context,
the development and stability of the banking sector, for which macroeconomic stability and
institutional development are key influential factors, is crucial to achieve a more stable and
steeper economic growth path. Thus, Chile’s greater macro stability and better institutional
setup can explain the country’s greater resilience to crises during the 1990s.
Most Latin American countries liberalized their financial systems during the 1990s,
but without putting sufficient attention to supporting the liberalization with macroeconomic
stability and proper bank regulation and supervision. Mexico’s crisis in 1994, for example,
                                                          
11   Section VI evaluates empirically the importance of the real exchange rate policy on economic growth and
volatility.
12  International experience suggests than market-based finance typically develops only after banking systems
have matured.-12-
followed a period of financial liberalization and expanding banking credit in the absence of
proper bank supervision and regulation. In other countries too, a policy mix of a lax fiscal
and tight monetary policy contributed to banking booms and busts (e.g. Brazil, 1994).
Microeconomic and institutional factors, such as poor bank management, weak prudential
regulation and bank supervision and poor protection of creditors’ property rights were also
responsible for bank problems in a number of cases like Venezuela and Bolivia in 1994,
Paraguay in 1996, Argentina in 2001, Uruguay in 2002 and the Dominican Republic in
2003. Finally, high dollarization in Latin American financial systems also added
vulnerability by increasing liquidity and solvency risks and by limiting de facto the scope
for an independent monetary policy.
13 Thus, macroeconomic stability (for instance,
stringent fiscal discipline) and soundness of the banking system (with a proper supervision
and regulation) made a big difference in explaining the difference in financial system
resilience to crises between Chile and the rest of the region in the 1990s
14.
Structural Reforms and Institutional Buildup
Regarding other structural reforms, as mentioned towards the end of the 1990s, most
Latin American countries had advanced in trade openness, financial liberalization and, to a
lesser extend, in tax reforms and privatization of SOEs (the so-called “first generation
reforms”). By 1995, the main elements of the reform package had been adopted by almost
all the countries in the region (Morley et al., 1999). The main difference in the
implementation of these reforms was that Chile had begun its reform process much earlier
than the rest of the countries. Trade liberalization lays at the heart of the reform process in
Latin America, marking a break with the past strategy of import substitution. In this regard,
Chile is also different from the rest of the region, as it was the first Latin American country
to embark on a program of trade liberalization. Trade reforms were launched in Chile in the
mid-1970s, a decade before the next reformer (Mexico), and by the end of that decade the
economy was relatively open. But the opening up process in Chile has continued until
today, first unilaterally and then granting better access to exports to big markets through the
sign of FTAs with developed economies.
In sum, macro stability, financial system development and the timing of the structural
reforms are important elements that differentiated Chile from other Latin American
countries in the early 1990s. However, there is another and even more important difference
between Chile and the rest of Latin America: Chile, unlike the rest of the region, continued
and deepened the reform process putting more emphasis in the institutional setup. A reform
process without an adequate institutional setup that supports it, most likely won’t have
significant and sustained effects on economic growth, and can even result in adverse
outcomes. For instance, as we already mentioned, if financial liberalization is not
accompanied by an appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework, most likely the
outcome will be a lending boom followed by a financial crisis, like it occurred in Chile and
                                                          
13  Latin America is one of the most dollarized regions in the world (IMF, 2004).
14  IDB (2004) shows how Chile’s quality of institutional variables, such as effective creditor rights, is much
better than in the rest of Latin America.-13-
other Latin American countries in the early 1980s
15. Similarly, a privatization program in a
corrupt environment will most likely have negative effects on growth.
The most recent literature on economic growth has emphasized the role of policies
and, most importantly, institutions, as the ultimate causes of factor accumulation and
productivity gains. There is a growing consensus in the literature that countries attain
higher economic growth when there is rule of law, property rights protection, low
bureaucracy, low corruption, adequate supervisory and regulatory frameworks that
guarantee a fair market competition, stable rules of the game, and adequate checks and
balances (Rodrik et al, 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003). All these factors contribute to the
design of better economic policies, give support, credibility and effectiveness to the
implemented policies, and provide a business environment that is more conducive to
investment, innovation and the hiring of labor.
The role of institutions is clearly illustrated in figure 7, which shows a scatter for 151
countries between per capita GDP (as of 2002) and the quality of the countries’ institutions.
Two conclusions are worth highlighting: (i) Latin American countries tend to be in the
bottom part of the figure (they tend to have poor institutions and low GDP per capita); and
(ii) Chile is the only Latin American country that appears significantly above the fitted line.
In fact, according to Kaufmann et al. (2003), as of 2002 Chile appears as the best-ranked
emerging market economy in terms of the quality of its institutions (average of six
categories), followed by Costa Rica and then Uruguay among Latin American countries.
Chile is even ranked higher than some developed countries, namely Spain, Japan, Hong
Kong and Italy (table 9). And the situation is very similar when looking at each of the index
components: government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; control of
corruption; voice and accountability; and political stability (only in the latter two Chile
appears in second place after Costa Rica among emerging market economies).
Chile has built and strengthened its institutions during the last thirty years. Figure 8
shows the evolution of some institutional variables since 1970 in selected Latin American
countries. As it is shown in the figure, Chile began, in general, with the worst institutions in
1970s, and today has the best institutions in the region and among emerging market
economies
16 Countries like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela have not advanced
much in their institutional development; further, some, as it is appreciated in figure 8, show
today worse institutions than thirty years ago.
This striking difference between Chile and the other Latin American countries
provides a plausible explanation for Chile’s better economic performance in the past
decades. But this is not all. Chile also advanced further than other economies in the
implementation of macroeconomic reforms, in some cases even concluding with
institutional arrangements that provide additional guarantees that there will be no
backtracking in the future. Two examples of the latter are the independence of the Central
Bank and the free trade agreements signed recently with important trade blocks and large
trade partners. Another example, although not yet fully institutionalized, is the structural
fiscal surplus rule. These arrangements enhance the sustainability of macro stability and the
market credibility and confidence.
                                                          
15  On this topic see De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995).
16  Uruguay and Costa Rica, that do not appear in the figures because of the lack of available data for all items
and years presented, also stand out from the rest of the region in some institutional aspects.-14-
Next we discuss the reform process in Chile since the early 1970s. The aim is to show
the breadth and depth of the reform process in Chile. Also, that the reform process has not
stopped; Chile continues implementing policies in many areas. And third, that the
institutional setup is not given; it can be modified (albeit slowly), so that countries with
poor institutions are not condemned by their legacy
17.
V.2 First Stage: The First Generation Reforms
When the economic reform process began, the Chilean economy was in complete
disarray as the state intervened in virtually every area of production and interfered in many
economic decisions. Furthermore, fiscal deficits were rampant and the economy was
isolated from the rest of the world through a complex battery of trade restrictions. In a
nutshell, by 1973 inflation was running at above 500% per year, the fiscal deficit was about
30% of GDP, and the peso was artificially overvalued as there were many capital and
current-account restrictions aimed at containing the external imbalance, including a
multiple exchange rate system. In addition, the average tariff was about 105%, though
effective protection varied across economic sectors due to a wide range of restrictions
including non-tariff barriers, and many prices were set (artificially low) by the government,
creating a shortage of goods and services in many markets. Further, the state owned about
600 enterprises, accounting for about 40% of GDP, and financial repression in the form of
controlled (negative) real interest rates and restrictions on credit allocation was widespread.
The military government that took power in late 1973 inherited an economy in
complete chaos. In the early years of the military government exchange rates were unified,
prices were liberalized for most goods and services, and several enterprises, farms and
banks that had been intervened and controlled by the state were returned to their previous
owners. In addition, a major fiscal package comprising drastic cuts in public investment
and subsidies, and a freeze in public sector wages, brought the fiscal deficit down to only
5% of GDP in 1974. The fiscal adjustment continued, bringing a 4% surplus only two years
later (in attaining this surplus it helped the economic recovery that followed the initial
reforms).
But reforms went far beyond achieving stabilization and correcting macroeconomic
imbalances. In 1975, for example, the sales tax was replaced by the value-added tax (VAT)
at a flat rate of 20%, thus improving the efficiency of resource allocation.
18 Also, non-tariff
trade barriers were lifted, while both the dispersion and the level of tariffs were unilaterally
reduced for most goods. This process continued into 1979, when a flat tariff of 10% was set
for most goods.
19
Major reforms were also introduced in the financial sector, where interest rates were
liberalized, banks privatized, mandatory credit allocation abolished, entry restrictions lifted,
                                                          
17  The reader that is not interested in the details of Chile’s reform process can skip subsections V.2 and V.3
and continue reading in section VI.
18 Over time, the VAT became the most important source of government revenue, amounting to about 50%
of total taxes.
19 Only a few exceptions remained, like cars and luxury items such as fur and jewelry.-15-
and the scope of permitted activities broadened. But the end of financial repression was not
preceded or accompanied by an upgrade —or even better, an overhaul— of the supervisory
and regulatory framework, thus exacerbating moral hazard and adverse-selection problems.
Furthermore, early on in the process one commercial bank went bankrupt and the
government provided full protection to depositors, thus intensifying moral hazard
problems. Unsurprisingly, after the financial liberalization process began, connected
lending grew unchecked; this was partly motivated by the simultaneous privatization of
banks and enterprises that had led to a high concentration of wealth. Along with over-
borrowing, banks incurred in highly concentrated portfolios and under-provisioning of non-
performing loans, the latter due to both low provisioning requirements and lax rules that
allowed non-performing loans to be rolled over (evergreening). Also, bank borrowers
incurred in huge currency mismatches in their balance sheets, a risk that was overlooked by
both banks and the supervisory agencies (i.e., bank borrowers’ exchange-rate risk exposure
became banks’ credit risk). In addition, a de facto deposit insurance system precluded
depositors to exert some kind of market discipline, further aggravating moral hazard
problems. This financial fragility made the overall system prone to crisis and proved to be
costly when the economy suffered severe shocks in the early 1980s.
The outcome of all the reforms above combined was a quick economic recovery and
a sharp reduction in both the fiscal deficit and the inflation rate. Indeed, after a sharp
recession in 1975
20, GDP grew on average by about 6.8% per year during 1976-81 (7.5% in
1977-81). Similarly, inflation fell sharply and reached the two-digit level just a few years
into the stabilization program, although it remained around 30% until 1980 (it was slightly
below 10% only in 1981). The fiscal balance was in surplus through the entire 1976-81
period and the economy received large amounts of private capital inflows, mainly in the
form of syndicated bank debt.
But major imbalances arose during this period. In particular, the real exchange rate
appreciated significantly, the current account deficit climbed to 14.5% of GDP in 1981, and
the financial sector weakened as major risks and vulnerabilities grew unchecked.
21 The
latter led to weak portfolios and undercapitalized banks, many of which accumulated
potential losses several times their capital base.
In this scenario of increasing macro-financial fragility, it is easy to understand why
the economy nose-dived when the external environment deteriorated in the early 1980s.
The balance of payments crisis and the abandonment of the nominal peg that followed were
unavoidable after private capital inflows came to a halt in 1982. The ensuing real
depreciation further aggravated the financial crisis because of the large currency
mismatches incurred by the private sector. As a result, real GDP fell by about 16.4%
(cumulative) during 1982-83.
The economic and financial crises caused a setback on some of the policies and
achievements of previous years. Indeed, the government had to take over 19 financial
institutions and ended up controlling about half of the total bank credit (the intervened
                                                          
20 The recession resulted from the fiscal stabilization program, the first oil shock, and the fall in the price of
copper in the world market.
21 As mentioned above, the risks included unmatched currency liabilities incurred by banks’ debtors, weak
asset rating systems, under-provisioning, connected lending, and rolling over of bad loans (evergreening
of banks’ balance sheets).-16-
institutions were later privatized, merged or shut down). Along with this, the government
took over several enterprises and non-bank financial intermediaries that belonged to the
conglomerates whose flagship banks were near collapse and had been intervened
22. In
addition, import tariffs were raised —albeit temporarily— to help the fiscal adjustment. All
of this represented a major setback to the market-oriented economic model implemented
since 1974, and forced the government to incur in a fiscal deficit and allow higher inflation
rates (in addition to the higher tariffs) to finance it.
It is important to single out two other reforms that were implemented just before the
debt crisis hit, which played a major role in the subsequent period: the new Constitution of
1980, and the pension system reform of 1981.
The new Constitution of 1980 is important not only because it set the timetable for
the return to a democratic regime in Chile, but also because it granted the power to allocate
government spending exclusively to the executive branch, thus closely linking expenditures
with revenues
23. Thus, today the Chilean Congress can either pass or reject the budget law
submitted to it by the government, but cannot amend such law. This has proven to be an
important factor for maintaining fiscal discipline. In addition, the new Constitution
prohibited the Central Bank from buying securities issued by the government, thus
precluding the monetization of the deficit. It was also given the explicit mandate to pursue
the stability of prices (or of the currency), the stability of external payments, and the
stability of the domestic payment system. Finally, it was granted full independence from
the executive branch by the way its authorities would be designated
24. (It should be
mentioned that although legislated earlier, these changes came into effect de facto in 1989,
with the country’s return to democracy).
The pension system reform of 1981 consisted of the phasing out of the bankrupt pay-
as-you-go system and the creation of a fully funded capitalization system run by private,
competing entities. In the new system workers make mandatory monthly contributions into
personal savings accounts, which are managed by specialized private entities, and whose
balances cannot be withdrawn before retirement. This reform led to an increase in total
savings and, at the same time, contributed to the development and deepening of the
domestic capital markets, thus indirectly helping to raise total factor productivity
25. In fact,
as the private entities managing these funds have become large lenders to both banks and
corporations, over the years they have induced an improvement in corporate governance
(figure 9).
                                                          
22 The fiscal cost of the financial crisis is estimated to be close to 40% of GDP. For more details on the
Chilean banking crisis of the 1980s, see Barandiarán and Hernández (1999).
23 Prior to this legal change, the legislative branch shared the power to allocate public money, but was not
required to provide the necessary funding, thus exacerbating the bias toward having a large fiscal deficit
purely for political reasons.
24 Pursuant to the law, the Central Bank is run by a Board composed of five members, each one appointed
for a term of ten years: every two years a new member is appointed. Board members are nominated by the
government, but need approval of the Senate. The Governor is then chosen among the five board members
by the country’s President for a period of five years or the time remaining in the member’s term, whatever
is shorter. The Deputy Governor is chosen by vote among the other members of the Central Bank Board.
25 See Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003).-17-
V.3 Second Stage: The Deepening and Institutionalization of Reforms
In the aftermath of the debt crisis, the government focused its policies on two areas:
redoing some of the work of previous years —privatizing banks and enterprises taken over
during the crisis, continue reducing the budget deficit and inflation— and overhauling the
institutional framework to correct the problems and regulatory shortcomings that had been
diagnosed during (and were partly responsible for) the crisis
26. Thus, a new tax law was
enacted in 1984, which provided special incentives for saving and investment. For instance,
profits became non-taxable if reinvested (taxes accrued only when profits were distributed
in the form of dividends) and the corporate tax rate was reduced.
27 Also, new banking and
bankruptcy laws were enacted in 1986. The new banking law granted more powers to the
supervisory and regulatory agencies, while updating specific regulations to keep up with
international standards and best practices. For instance, more stringent restrictions were
imposed on loans granted to related parties, on asset classification by banks, on
provisioning and on the reporting of non-performing loans, thus significantly reducing the
scope for incurring in connected lending and the rolling over of bad loans. With respect to
bankruptcy procedures, the new law set forth very clear steps for the liquidation and closure
of banks. Also, clear seniorities were established for the payment of debts to creditors,
while bankruptcy procedures were expedited.
Other important institutional changes included the setting of a framework for
controlling and monitoring monopolistic practices, and the privatization of SOEs,
comprising not only banks and other firms taken over during the debt crisis, but also
utilities formerly owned and operated by the state, such as electricity generation and
distribution, long-distance and local telephone companies. The privatizations undertaken
during this period, as opposed to those implemented during 1974-81, were designed to
spread ownership among a larger group of investors, so that the high concentration of
wealth that had resulted before could be avoided. For this purpose, tax and other incentives,
such as low-cost loans, were provided to individuals for them to buy shares of the
privatized companies. The new wave of privatization brought the share of SOEs in GDP
down from 24% in 1983, to 13% in 1989. In addition of passing an antitrust law, specific
rules were approved for the setting of prices of natural monopolies, such as electric and
telephone companies, and in other industries such as public transportation.
In 1989, a new Central Bank law was enacted, whereby the Central Bank’s sole
objectives are the stability of prices, the stability of the domestic payment system, and the
                                                          
26 It should be stressed that the decision to maintain the outward oriented market-economy model in the
aftermath of the debt crisis was crucial to determine the country’s economic performance in subsequent
years. Indeed, after that almost a decade of economic reforms had ended in a recession and deep financial
crisis, the development model was discredited. In this setting it could have been easily replaced by the
inward looking model with greater government intervention, thus reversing the progress achieved during
the past decade. Fortunately, the authorities at the time decided to maintain the same overall development
strategy, focussing instead on correcting its institutional and regulatory shortcomings.
27 At the same time, double taxation on dividends was abolished by giving shareholders a tax credit, to be
used in their personal income tax, equal to the proportional corporate tax paid by the company. This way
the tax-induced bias in favor of corporate borrowing to finance investment was eliminated (Modigliani-
Miller’s modified proposition, 1963). In addition, special tax incentives were provided for the issuance of
equity. Buyers of new shares, IPOs, received a tax credit, equal to a fraction of their investment, which
would last for as long as they held on to the new shares. For details see Hernández and Walker (1993).-18-
stability of Chile’s external payments. This new charter led the Central Bank, now
autonomous, to adopt in 1991 a monetary policy scheme based on inflation targeting and a
widening exchange rate band. The exchange rate band was abolished later on (in 1999),
leading to a free-floating regime in which the Central Bank rarely intervenes, that is, only
when the exchange rate market becomes dysfunctional and the exchange rate is clearly
misaligned from its fundamentals. As a result of all these changes, the inflation rate in
Chile today has converged to the Central Bank’s steady-state target, a range of 2 to 4
percent per year, a level that nobody thought feasible just a decade ago
28.
Also, new legislation allowing the participation of the private sector in infrastructure
development was passed in 1991-92. According to it, roads, highways, airports, seaports
and other infrastructure projects may be developed by the private sector under build,
operate and transfer (BOT) arrangements. As of 1998, 21 projects for a combined total of
about US$3.6 billion had been developed under this arrangement (several others have been
approved and completed, or are near completion, since then). And in 1994, a new law was
passed permitting free entry to the —until then monopolistic— long-distance
telecommunications market, the so-called “multi-carrier” system. This change has shaped a
highly competitive market and caused a drastic fall in long-distance telephone rates.
It is important to mention that during this period the country successfully transited
from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. Despite all the uncertainties surrounding this
transition, the change was smooth, in part because the new Administration confirmed most
of the market economy elements already in place, while concentrating on a social agenda.
This way the economic institutions created in previous years were validated and in many
cases strengthened, so that uncertainty vanished. For instance, early on in 1990 the new
democratic government deepened the opening up process by reducing the maximum import
tariff from 15% to 11%. In fact, all three governments that have been in power since 1990
have strengthened the market economy model, accelerated the opening up process,
consolidated the fiscal position and improved regulations, while, at the same time, they
have emphasized social policies and implemented new programs to alleviate poverty.
However, in labor market flexibility there has been some backtracking.
But the reform process has continued up to now with the introduction of policies and
institutional changes aimed at further consolidating the market-oriented economic model
and improving the Chilean economy’s resilience to shocks. Thus, amendments to the
banking law in 1997 allowed banks to undertake new businesses, including lending
internationally, while upgrading some regulations, i.e., the Basel capital accord was
adopted. In 1998 a law was passed unilaterally reducing the import tariff by one percentage
point every year, stopping at 6% in January 2003. Furthermore, in 2002 Chile signed free
trade agreements with the European Union, in 2003 with the United States and in 2004 with
South Korea, thus consolidating the process of integration with the world economy. Also,
in 2001 the government committed to achieving and maintaining a 1% structural fiscal
surplus. Under this commitment, government expenditures are set to be 1% of GDP less
than the Government’s structural revenues, which are defined as the revenues that would
occur in steady state. In other words, expenditures are 1% less than the revenues that would
occur if the economy were on its long-term path (after eliminating cyclical variations in
taxes and other key variables, such as the price of copper and the level of international
                                                          
28 Thus, an inflation that started to develop in 1860 was finally controlled by the late 1990s.-19-
interest rates). This rule is intended to guarantee that the government will remain solvent in
the long run. Also in 2001, all remaining capital controls were abolished, ending more than
half a century of a partly closed capital account. And during this period regulatory and tax
changes were introduced, aimed at increasing the efficiency of capital markets and
providing incentives to save. Among these: taxes on capital gains in the stock market were
abolished; voluntary (tax-free) contributions into personal retirement savings accounts were
allowed; the tax on interests paid to foreign investors in peso-denominated bonds was
reduced from 35% to 4%; and some regulations restraining mutual funds and insurance
companies were lifted.
29 Also, during this period the exchange rate band was abandoned,
consolidating both the inflation targeting and the free float regimes, while a voluntary
unemployment insurance scheme was introduced. Finally, in 2003 three new laws were
passed that (i) established a clearer career path for public servants, based on merits, thereby
significantly reducing the scope for the government to appoint political allies in senior
positions; (ii) provided public funding for political parties; and (iii) regulated private
donations to political parties and candidates. These three laws should increase transparency,
reduce the scope for corruption, and allow the public sector to attract more qualified people.
And currently other initiatives are underway to further improve the efficiency and foster the
development of the Chilean capital market including venture capital.
30
In sum, Chile not only began its economic reform process a decade earlier than the
rest of Latin America; it also completed and deepened many of the reforms in subsequent
years. Further, it changed the institutional setup to enhance the credibility —and
effectiveness— of its policies and the country’s resilience to shocks. Without the continuos
progress in all these areas, most likely the pay-off in terms of growth would have been less
than it was and the economy would have remained highly vulnerable to crises.
VI. Deepening the Reforms: What is at Stake?
The previous section has shown how Chile introduced and deepened the reforms,
putting special emphasis on the institutional buildup. In the process, the country has
established high credibility and its institutions have won reputation, being today of better
quality than all other countries in the region. The latter is reflected in the country’s risk
premium, which in 2003-04 attained one of the lowest levels among all emerging market
economies (figure 10).
Based on Chile’s experience an interesting question arises: What benefits would
accrue to countries that intensify their reform process to attain Chile’s —or higher—
standards in terms of macroeconomic indicators, policies and, most important, institutions?
To answer the question above we follow the standard procedure found in the
literature and run two sets of regressions using a cross section of about 80 countries. In the
first set of regressions the dependent variable is the average growth of per-capita GDP
during 1960-2000. In the second set the dependent variable is the volatility (measured by
the standard deviation) of the per-capita GDP growth rate over the same time period. The
second set of regressions is motivated by recent research by Acemoglu et al. (2003) that
                                                          
29 Capital Markets Reform I.
30 Capital Markets Reform II.-20-
suggests that volatility is not caused only by bad policies —exchange rate overvaluation,
inflation, government consumption, or other— but also by poor quality institutions. Poor
quality institutions may cause volatility directly and indirectly by leading to bad economic
policies. The two regressions are of the following form:
(1) i i i i X Y ε α α α + + + =
•
2 1 0 QI  
(2) i i i i X Y µ β β β σ + + + =
•
2 1 0 QI  
where Y is per-capita GDP, QI is an index measuring the quality of institutions in each
country, X is a set of other explanatory variables, and ε and µ are random terms (a dot
above a variable means percentage change).
Following the standard literature, the set of explanatory variables X includes initial
conditions, policy variables, and one endowment/geography variable. Among the initial
conditions we include the log of per-capita GDP in 1960, and the average years of
schooling in 1960 (the latter variable only for equation 1). Policy variables include
openness (measured as exports plus imports over GDP
31), government consumption (in
percentage of GDP), the real exchange rate overvaluation, the exchange rate black-market
premium, and financial development measured as the ratio of private credit to GDP. Other
explanatory variables included in the regressions are the growth and the volatility of the
terms of trade. In equation (2) we also include inflation and its volatility, and the volatility
of government consumption and exchange rate overvaluation. All the policy variables are
measured as the average for the 1960-2000 period. The endowment/geography variable is
either a dummy indicating whether the country has access to the seacoast, or the proportion
of land area within 100 km of the seacoast.
32
The quality of institutions, QI, is measured by the average for 1996-2000 of the
following six indices
33:
                                                          
31 For robustness checking, in a few regressions we use the alternative suggested by Calderón, Loayza and
Servén (2003), but the results do not change. This alternative variable is labeled openness 2 in tables A.2
through A.7.
32 The precise definition and source for each variable is provided in table A.1 in the appendix.
33 Other papers use Rule of Law as an indicator of the quality of institutions. Although we use a broader
index, the results reported below are robust to the use of Rule of Law. Besides, the correlation between
our broader index and the latter is 0.97.-21-
Index Definition
Voice and accountability Extent to which citizens can choose their government, political
rights, civil liberties, and an independent press.
Political instability and violence Likelihood that the government will be overthrown by
unconstitutional or violent means.
Government effectiveness Quality of public service delivery, competence of civil servants,
and the degree of politicization of civil service.
Regulatory burden
Government control on goods markets, government interference
in the banking system, excessive bureaucracy to start a new
business, and excessive regulation of private businesses and
international trade.
Rule of law Protection of individuals and property against violence or theft,
independent and effective judges, and contract enforcement.
Graft or control of corruption Use of public power for private gain and degree of corruption.
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2003)
The estimation of equations (1) and (2) poses a problem, namely the potential
endogeneity of some of the right-hand-side variables; in particular, openness, financial
development and the quality of institutions. To address this problem we use two-stage least
squares and the standard instruments suggested in the literature. The instrument for
openness is the fitted value that results from a gravity equation as suggested by Frankel and
Romer (1999)
34. For the quality of institutions we use a set of alternative instruments
commonly used in the literature on institutions and growth, namely the distance from the
Equator of the capital city, the etno-linguistic fraction of the population, the fraction of the
population speaking English, the fraction of the population speaking one of the major
languages of Western Europe, and the origin of the legal system
35. Regarding the validity of
our instruments, first step regressions show a good fit (adjusted R
2 over 0.65). Also, in
appendices A.4 and A.7 we run estimations including different combinations of the
instruments mentioned above, and the results remain robust. So, we accept these
endowment and historical variables as exogenous determinants of the quality of
institutions
36.
In the case of financial development, we take stock of the mounting evidence
provided in recent years proving that “financial development causes growth” and treat it as
an exogenous variable. (Just for completeness we instrument this variable using the origin
                                                          
34  The Frankel and Romer approach consists of first regressing bilateral trade flows (as a share of each
country’s GDP) on measures of the country’s mass, distance between the trade partners, and a few other
geographical variables; and second constructing a predicted aggregate trade share for each country on the
basis of the estimated coefficients. This constructed trade share is then used as an instrument for actual
trade shares in estimating the impact of trade on economic growth.
35 Another instrument proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001) is the mortality rate of settlers. We do not use it
because doing so would reduce our sample size significantly.
36  Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2002) undertake tests to show the validity of this kind of
endowment and historical instruments as exogenous determinants of the quality of institutions.-22-
of the legal system, as suggested by La Porta et al. (1999), but the results change only
marginally)
37.
The main results of estimating equations (1) and (2) are reported in tables 10 and 11,
respectively. In the final regressions reported in the tables we have excluded some variables
that were consistently insignificant (the regressions where we include these variables and
test for robustness are reported in tables A.2 through A.8 in the appendix)
38, 39.
The first two regressions (columns) in table 10 are simple OLS, before and after
controlling for the quality of institutions. The main conclusion that emerges from
comparing the first two columns is that institutions matter, that is, not only the α1
coefficient turns out to be significant, but excluding the institutions variable biases upwards
(in absolute value) all the other coefficients, except for initial GDP. Note also that the
results from columns 1 and 2 are consistent with previous findings: there is convergence in
per-capita GDP (poorer countries tend to grow faster), education and financial development
affect growth positively, while keeping an overvalued exchange rate is detrimental to
growth. Openness and government consumption, although having the right sign, do not
attain statistical significance at the standard levels
40.
As argued, some of the right-hand side variables may be endogenous and that may be
causing a bias in the results. Columns 3 through 7 address this problem by using
instruments. In the regression in column 3 we use instruments only for the institutions
variable, in the one in column 4 we use instruments for institutions and openness but not for
financial development, and in column 5 we use instruments for financial development and
institutions, but not for openness. The regression in column 6 excludes the institutions
variable and uses instruments for financial development and openness, and the regression in
column 7 includes institutions and uses instruments for all the potentially endogenous
variables.
The conclusions that emerge from columns 3 through 7 are very similar to those from
columns 1 and 2, that is, institutions matter (excluding this variable biases all other
coefficients), there is per-capita GDP convergence, the level of education matters, and
among the policy variables the most important are exchange rate overvaluation and
financial development. In addition, when using an instrument for financial development,
                                                          
37 See footnote 32.
38 In table A.2 we use an instrument only for the institutions variable and try several combinations of the
control variables. In table A.3 we use also instruments for openness and financial development (and try
different control variables). In table A.4 we try different instruments and a different definition for
openness. The same structure is applied in tables A.5-A.7 for the case of growth volatility (equation 2).
39 It should be mentioned that, as we follow the standard literature, our results are subject to the same caveats
and shortcomings of all recent papers on institutions and growth, in particular with respect to the choice
and validity of the instruments and the estimation procedure (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2003; La Porta et al.,
1999). For a test on the validity of the instruments see Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al.
(2002).
40 Empirical results indicate that the effect of openness on GDP growth is ambiguous. In particular, cross-
section studies tend to find no such effect or the effect, when shown, is not robust, while a positive and
robust effect emerges in panel data studies that capture the temporal effect of openness. See Calderón et
al. (2004) for a complete review of empirical literature about the effect of openness on economic growth.-23-
the corresponding coefficient turns out larger but is estimated less precisely (its marginal
significance level is about 13% in columns 5 and 7).
Three other conclusions are worth noting from table 10 (and confirmed by the
robustness tests in tables A.2 through A.4). First, the coefficient that accompanies the
institution variable, α1, is robust to many alternative specifications and very stable at
around 0.010. Second, the coefficients for the education and exchange rate overvaluation
variables are not biased (or are only marginally so) when the institutions variable is
excluded. And third, financial development matters for growth on its own, even after
controlling for the quality of institutions.
Using the results from tables 10 and A.2 through A.4 (using the average coefficient ±
one std. deviation), it is possible to estimate the potential effect for the average Latin
American country of adopting Chile’s institutions, or even better, the institutions of the
developed countries, or Finland’s, the top one among all the countries in the sample. The
results, reported in table 12, indicate that by having institutions of quality similar to Chile’s,
the average Latin American country could raise its per-capita GDP growth rate between
0.9% and 2.3% per year (or by about 1.6% per year, on average). Or better still, by having
Finland’s institutions the increase would be between 1.3% and 3.3% per year (or by about
2.3% per year, on average). In this case Chile’s per-capita GDP growth would raise by
about 0.7% per year on average. Note that Chile having developed countries’ institutions
could raise its per-capita GDP growth rate by only 0.1%, because the difference between
Chile’s and the advanced economies’ institutions is marginal
41. Compared with historical
growth rates of per capita GDP in Latin America (1.2% p.a. during 1960-2000, using a
simple average, and 1.8% p.a. taking a GDP-weighted average), the potential raise is quite
significant. It means that, on average, per capita GDP would double in about 20-25
42 years
instead of 60 (these numbers change to 22-18
43 instead of 38 if using the GDP-weighted
average).
Similarly, the effect on the average Latin American country of adopting Chile’s
policies (financial development and real exchange rate overvaluation) is shown in tables 13
and 14. Regarding financial development, the average Latin American country could raise
its per-capita GDP growth rate by 0.8%, on average (between 0.4% and 1.2%), by having
Chile’s financial development. And by having the mean of the major advanced economies’
financial development, the average LAC country could raise its per-capita GDP growth rate
by 1.1%, on average (between 0.6% and 1.7%). Finally, the average Latin American
country could raise its per-capita GDP growth rate by 1.4%, on average (between 0.7% and
2.1%), by having Switzerland’s financial development. With regards to real exchange rate
overvaluation, the average Latin American country could raise its per-capita GDP growth
rate by 0.2% on average (between 0.1% and 0.3%), by pursuing policies aimed at attaining
a real exchange rate overvaluation similar to Chile’s.
                                                          
41   Similarly, by having institutions like the major advanced economies’ the average LAC country could raise
its per-capita GDP growth rate by 1.7%.
42 20 if compared to Finland’s institutions and 25 if compared to Chile’s.
43 18 if compared to Finland’s institutions and 22 if compared to Chile’s.-24-
In sum, by adopting policies (financial development and real exchange rate
overvaluation) similar to Chile’s, the average Latin American country could raise its per-
capita GDP growth rate by about 1.0% per year, on average.
The results above also provide an explanation for Latin America’s poorer
performance during the 1990s vis-a-vis Chile or East Asia (this is reported in table 15). In
the former case, about half of the predicted growth difference can be explained by better
institutions and about half by better policies (differences in initial conditions matter, but
less than differences in policies and institutions). In the latter case, policies played a much
greater role, mainly because there is not much difference in the quality of institutions
between the average Latin American country and the average East Asian country. More
precisely, about 75% of the faster economic growth (predicted) in East Asia is due to better
policies and only 25% to better institutions. Finally, among policies, the sustained
overvaluation of the real exchange rate, although adding to the poor performance of the
average Latin American country, plays a lesser role than financial development.
With regards to GDP growth volatility, the results reported in table 11 suggest that
the quality of institutions matter —better institutions reduce volatility— and, therefore,
excluding this variable biases all the coefficients, especially the one on financial
development (note that tables 11 and 10 are similar in structure)
44. In addition, using
instruments (2SLS) changes the parameters of some variables (β1 appears to be less stable
than α1 as reported in table 10). Most important, the only variable besides institutions that
matter is the overvaluation of the exchange rate (keeping an overvalued exchange rate
raises GDP growth volatility).
Finally, table 16 reports the (again, simulated) effect on the volatility of per-capita
GPD growth for the average Latin American country, of it adopting institutions of similar
quality to Chile’s, or even better, Finland’s. The reduction is significant: volatility would
fall on average by about 40% per year (from 4.2% to 2.5%) in the former case, and by
about 57% (from 4.2% to 1.8%) in the latter (numbers are very similar if using simple or
weighted average historical data).
Similarly, table 17 shows the effect on the volatility of per-capita GPD growth, for
the average Latin American country, of it having a real exchange rate overvaluation similar
to Chile’s. Volatility would fall on average by about 10% per year (from 4.2% to 3.8%) by
having Chile’s real exchange rate overvaluation (numbers are very similar if using simple
or weighted average historical data).
Before closing this section a methodological note is in order. The dependent variables
in equations 1 and 2 are the average and the volatility of the per-capita GDP growth rate for
1960-2000, respectively, while, in both regressions the variable indicating the quality of
each country’s institutions, QI, is measured over 1996-2000. This measurement problem
could invalidate our results. To check for the robustness of our findings we re-estimate both
                                                          
44 That is, regressions in columns 1 and 2 are OLS estimations with and without the institutions variable;
regressions in columns 3 through 5 use instruments for some of the potentially endogenous variables (in
the same order explained in the text); and columns 6 and 7 use instruments for all the endogenous
variables, openness, financial development and quality of institutions (column 7).-25-
cross-sectional regressions for the shorter sample period, although doing this may lead to
less precise results due to the greater importance of cyclical factors
45. The results of these
new estimations are presented in table A.8 in the appendix
46. As expected, some of the
explanatory variables lose statistical significance, in particular financial development, the
overvaluation of the real exchange rate and average schooling years. However, the quality
of institution variable turns out to be statistically significant, with the correct sign and with
even larger coefficients than before, which shows that our main result regarding the
institutional set up is robust to changing (shortening) the sample period.
VII. The Challenge Ahead for Latin American Economies: Lessons from
Chile
After analyzing the Chilean experience and the economic development processes of
other countries, it can be argued that, from an analytical perspective, the economic
development process consists of three stages. The first stage consists of achieving
macroeconomic stability, liberalizing markets and prices throughout the economy, and
integrating the economy to the rest of the world. The second one consists of building an
institutional framework to support
47, give credibility and enhance the effectiveness of the
policies and reforms implemented in the first stage. And the third one consists of improving
those institutions that are related with the microestructure of specific markets (for instance,
antitrust and labor market laws) in order to gain more efficiency and improve income
inequality. And this is in addition to the need of keeping reviewing the reforms and policies
implemented in order to look for areas where efficiency gains can occur.
Public discussion in Chile has in recent years focused on issues pertaining to the third
stage as the country has already achieved macro stability and developed a credible
institutional framework. In other words, Chile is not currently thinking about how to
resolve the next crisis, but about medium-term challenges such as how to improve income
inequality and give more opportunities to the poor. In contrast, many Latin American
countries still have problems pertaining to the first and second stages. As it was described
above, just a few years ago some Latin American countries suffered costly crises due to
fiscal problems and a weak financial system, while the institutional quality in most Latin
American countries is still very poor.
 Therefore, the challenges ahead for the Latin American economies, that arise from
the Chilean experience, are straightforward: countries should advance in all fronts, macro
reforms (especially those countries that have not yet attained macroeconomic stability),
micro reforms (promote market competition, price flexibility, etc.) and –the focus of this
                                                          
45 It should be noted that the growth literature tries to identify the determinants of long-term growth. For this
purpose, the standard approach is to take averages over long periods of time, which smoothes out cyclical
fluctuations. Using a five-year period does not guarantee that cyclical factors are cancelled out, which
could reduce the precision in the estimation.
46 For the economic growth equation (Eq. 1) we report the same regression as equation 7 in table 10, while
for the volatility equation (Eq. 2) we report the same regression as equation 2 in table 11. Other
regressions are available upon request.
47  Financial development and soundness, another pillar of the Chilean economic model, depends on both
stages, macroeconomic stability and the institutional framework.-26-
paper– upgrading and strengthening their institutions. The need to advance in all these
fronts becomes even more urgent given the impending globalization trend. In other words,
given the increasing (and unavoidable) integration of the world economy, in both goods and
capital flows, countries that do not reform their economies and institutions not only will not
reap all the benefits from this trend, but will also become increasingly prone to crises. It
should also be mentioned that the longer countries try to delay —most likely
unsuccessfully— their integration into the world economy, the wider the income gap with
the industrial world will be. The latter because in a world of very rapid and frequent
technological changes, opportunities arise and are exploited quickly by the most dynamic
and open economy. In sum, the globalization trend presents opportunities, but the potential
benefits will not materialize if countries do not upgrade their institutions and policies.
The above is more easily said than done. This, because there are no short-cuts and the
experience of one country cannot be easily replicated by another; what works in one case
does not necessarily work in another. So, to make progress countries should be innovative
in the design of their policies and institutions. One example is Chile’s 1981 pension reform.
The new system and the transition from the old one was not copied from elsewhere; it was
brand new and started from scratch. Countries that have tried to copy the Chilean system,
however, have not always succeeded because of their own idiosyncrasies. Another example
is the unremunerated reserve requirement or encaje that Chile used in the 1990s that, albeit
some controversy about its effectiveness in achieving all the objectives for which it was
designed, at least changed the composition of capital inflows toward the more stable and
with longer maturities. This policy tool worked in Chile because of the rule of law and the
tight monitoring exerted by the Central Bank on commercial banks, but by its nature is a
potential source for corruption.
Despite these caveats, there are a few general lessons to be learned from Chile’s
experience, and from other successful experiences, that can be extended to other Latin
American countries:
Regarding macroeconomic stability and first generation reforms
•  Fiscal responsibility is a must. This because other macro objectives —low inflation,
financial sector stability, balance of payments stability— may not be attainable without
it. Further, fiscal sustainability leads to lower country risk and reduces the volatility of
capital flows, all of which ease the adjustment to shocks. Whether fiscal policy is
designed to be countercyclical, while desirable, is not as important as to put in place
mechanisms to assure fiscal sustainability. Chile’s structural fiscal surplus rule may not
work for every country, but is one alternative way to proceed.
•  As for exchange rate policy, experience has taught that intermediate regimes are subject
to attacks (especially with the de facto increasing financial integration). Further, capital
controls are not very effective, except for very short periods of time, and used along
with sterilization policies can be quite costly (in addition to being a potential source of
corruption). Therefore, countries have to choose between a float and a hard peg. A float
eases the adjustment to external shocks that require the real exchange rate to depreciate,
and permits using monetary policy in a countercyclical fashion; however, it requires to
have in place a credible nominal anchor. On the other hand, a hard peg calls for a highly-27-
flexible economy, especially with regards to the labor market, and a very solid banking
system. The latter conditions may be hard to meet in Latin American countries.
•  The mix of inflation targeting, financial integration, and a float has functioned well in
Chile’s case in the past decade. Similarly, a hard peg and capital mobility have
functioned well in Hong Kong for more than two decades. Which way to go is hard to
say as it depends on each country’s characteristics: whether there is an alternative
credible anchor, which, in turn, depends on the track record and reputation of the
Central Bank, the strength of banks, and the flexibility of prices (wages).
•  One important lesson to be drawn is that, irrespective of the specific exchange rate and
monetary policy arrangements, the macro policy mix must be internally consistent and
robust to different scenarios. Policies must prove to work in periods of bonanza as well
as during global slowdowns; this is the only way that credibility will be enhanced,
diminishing the likelihood of speculative (unfounded) attacks.
•  Countries should advance further in completing the so-called first generation reforms,
in particular, in attaining macro stability. It should be stressed that second generation
reforms are conditional on macro recovery and sustainability. In addition, countries
should move forward in completing their trade liberalization processes. Given the
sluggishness of multilateral agreements, like those under the auspices of the WTO,
unilateral tariff reductions and bilateral free trade agreements —such as those of Chile
with South Korea, the US or the European Union— may be valid alternatives.
•  Financial sector supervision and regulation must be upgraded and the banking sector
strengthened. Whether regulation is organized by type of institution (i.e., banks versus
financial companies) or by type of activity (i.e., mortgages versus credit cards) is open
to discussion. Similarly, there is no clear cut on whether the industry should be
organized under the universal banking model or the narrow banking model. But it is
clear that a weak financial sector can become a major obstacle to implement macro
policies and, most importantly, to attain macroeconomic stability. Further, a stronger
financial sector will foster the growth process.
•  In order to enhance the chances of attaining higher economic growth on a sustained
basis, countries should implement reforms and policies aimed at fostering the
development of the financial sector. A sound and modern banking regulation is a must
in order to avoid financial crises.
•  Significant progress is needed throughout the region in the areas of privatization of state
owned enterprises and tax reforms. However, before proceeding with the privatization
of SOEs at least two conditions must be met: (i) a transparent mechanism for
privatization must be designed, to minimize the chances of corruption; and (ii) a clear
regulatory framework, including rate setting mechanisms, must be designed for utilities
and other natural monopolies. If these conditions are not met, the privatization process
will not have public support, leading to government intervention and setbacks.
Regarding the institutional buildup
•  Beyond the macro and first generation structural reforms, and even more important as it
can be concluded both from the Chilean experience and from the empirical analysis,
significant progress is needed in improving the compliance with the rule of law, raising-28-
government effectiveness, reducing corruption, protecting property rights, increasing
the efficiency of the judiciary, enhancing market competition, and limiting political
interference with monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies. The institutional buildup
is fundamental in order to support, give credibility and enhance effectiveness of the
different reforms and policies, and to put the right incentives for investment, labor
hiring, and most important, technological innovation. Moreover, the institutionalization
of reforms reduces the uncertainties about the continuity of the reform process and the
risk of potential setbacks.
Regarding income inequality
48
•  And finally, there are two areas where every Latin American country, including Chile,
has to make significant progress, namely income distribution and labor market
flexibility. Although seemingly unrelated, we discuss them together because reforms in
these areas will affect (favorably) mostly the poor.
-  Labor market reform should be aimed at reducing hiring in the informal economy,
where employers fail to provide social security, medical insurance and other
mandatory benefits. In addition, increasing labor market flexibility would benefit
mainly unskilled workers who are hurt the most with cyclical fluctuations because
of minimum wages or because they are more easily replaced. It should also be noted
that the main way through which the unskilled can raise their human capital —and
income— is by staying employed (through on-the-job training).
-  And with regards to income distribution, the challenge is to design policies that
allow the poor to work their way out of poverty; that is, to break the vicious circle
by which children of poor people remain poor because they do not have access to a
proper education. Among other, key components in the design of these policies are
(i) to provide more and better education for the poor (according to international
standardized tests, education in Latin America is inadequate), and (ii) to grant more
access to credit to micro and small enterprises. Evidence suggests that small and
micro enterprises, which employ a large fraction of the poor and unskilled, have no
access to formal credit, whereby they end up paying a high cost of funding (when
available through informal channels) or cannot invest and grow. Besides, many
micro enterprises remain in the informal sector for years. State policies aimed at
fostering the development of small and micro firms may have a significant impact
on income distribution in the medium term. With regards to education, it should be
emphasized that designing adequate policies becomes more urgent because of the
globalization trend mentioned above, that is, because technological changes tend to
benefit more the skilled and educated groups that can adjust to and adopt the new
technologies more easily.
-  The need to improve income distribution becomes even more urgent if one takes
into account that in order to be sustainable the reform process needs public support.
If a large part of the population feels that they are left behind, there is an increasing
risk of social unrest and track backing in the reform process.
                                                          
48   Although income inequality is not the focus of this paper, we discuss briefly it as another challenge to the
economic development in Latin America.-29-
VIII. Summary and Conclusions
This paper addresses the issue of how can countries in Latin America, and other
developing regions, accelerate their growth rates and close their per capita income gap with
the industrial countries. The main motivation of the paper is to contrast the experience of
Chile, that during the 1990s grew at high rates and reduced its poverty rate sharply, with the
rest of the region that, although recovering from the very poor performance of the 1980s
(the so-called lost decade), failed to resume the growth rates of the 1960s and 1970s.
Based on recent theoretical and empirical findings, we argue that Chile's success
story is due to the breadth of its reform process, that continues to this date and has been
much deeper and broader in scope than that carried out in other countries. The reform has
not only boosted the country's macro fundamentals but also upgraded and strengthened its
institutions. The high payoff from Chile’s reform is due to its breadth and continuance
through time.
One conclusion of the paper is that Latin American countries should put additional
effort in their reform processes, in many cases completing the so-called first generation
reforms: e.g., fiscal stability and trade liberalization. But there is also the need to advance
in second generation reforms: upgrading of the supervisory and regulatory framework of
banks, enhancing market competition and market discipline, upgrading of the regulatory
framework for utilities (including a clear rate-setting mechanism), putting in place a
framework for private sector participation in infrastructure development, and reforming
pension systems. The latter in the case of Chile has proven to be key to the attainment of
deeper financial markets, better corporate governance and higher economic growth.
All the reforms above are part of the macroeconomic-institutional realm and can be
implemented, albeit at different pace each. But continuos progress in all areas is needed as
reforms are complementary and stagnation in one area may compromise the success of the
reforms in others. Further, there are no easy policy recommendations as reforms cannot be
easily copied from one country to another. Each country has to design its own policies and
implement them taking into account its own characteristics: the way China has proceeded
in the past two decades is not a replica of the reforms implemented elsewhere, while
Chile’s experience with reforms has been a stop-go story.
A second conclusion of the paper refers to the importance of other institutions —rule
of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability— that are beyond
the realm of political economy but, nevertheless, affect growth significantly. Although
there is no straightforward conclusion in this respect, we share the view that these
institutions are not given and countries are not condemned to their legacy. Although at a
much slower pace than other reforms, over time countries can modify these institutions.
Two examples in this respect are Chile and Singapore (although the latter is far more
advanced than the former in this respect). In the case of Chile, for instance, after 30 years of
reforms the general public have begun to acknowledge the importance of building a strong
institutional setup to provide and support a market friendly environment with stable rules of
the game that attracts investors, foreign or domestic. The latter allowed the government
recently to pass legislation to establish a merit-based career for public servants, which
reduces the chances of appointing political allies. Similarly, after about 20 years since the-30-
pension reform, workers (in the formal market) have become increasingly aware that their
pension depends on their own contributions to their retirement funds and not on
governmental policies. Therefore, they are much more demanding than in the past with
regards to transparency, disclosure, regulatory issues and other aspects pertaining to the
pension fund industry.
One final challenge of Latin American countries is the urgent need to make real
progress in social policies throughout the region, including Chile, especially those aimed at
protecting the poorest groups. This, because of the ongoing globalization trend that
exacerbates the technological gap that exists among countries, and the different capability
of the different groups of society within a country to adjust to new technologies. As a result
of the rapidly changing environment, the unskilled and uneducated are expected to be hurt
proportionately more than other groups. Thus, making progress in the macro, micro and
institutional fronts to accelerate growth and reap the benefits from the ongoing
globalization trend is not enough; it must be accompanied by adequate social policies —
better opportunities to acquiring human capital— to assure that the poor are not left behind.
Not making progress in improving income distribution could undermine public support for
the reform process, jeopardizing its continuance through time and risking social unrest and
major setbacks or worse, reversals.-31-
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Total Trade Financial Taxation Privatization Labor
Up to 1989 Up to 1994 Up to 1999
Note: Progress in reform is measured as the usage (in percent) in each date, of the total potential
room for reform available in 1985. The potential available in 1985 is measured by the difference
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Note: East Asia includes China, Hong-Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.






















Source: Own elaboration. 
1 PPP adjusted.
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LAC’s Economic and Financial System Indicators
(Selected Countries)
Figure 6.1
Consequences of Crisis: Real GDP Growth
(%)
Note: Year t are as follows: Mexico: 1995; Ecuador:




LAC’s Public Debt, 1990-2002









































































Note: The assets of the financial system include liquid
liabilities of banks and non-bank financial institutions,
stock market capitalization, and domestic private and
public bond.
Source: Beck, Demigurc-Kunt and Levine (2003).
Figure 6.4
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Sources: World Bank, and Kaufmann et al. (2003)-39-
Figure 8
Latin American Countries: Quality of Institutions, 1970-2002
(Selected countries)






















































Source: Frasier Institute (2004)
Note: The Economic Freedom Index includes five areas: size of government, legal structure and security of property rights, access to sound money,
regulation of credit, labor and business, and freedom to trade internationally. A higher index value represents a better quality of institutions.-40-
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Table 1
Current Account Balance and Economic Performance of LACs during the Debt Crisis







Costa Rica -13.4 -2.2
Dominican Republic -7.2 3.2
Ecuador -7.1 -0.8








Region’s average -5.8 -2.4

































El Salvador 2.7 3.3
Peru 2.7 3.4
















Adult literacy rate, Infant mortality
(Years) (% of people ages 15 and above) (per 1000 live births)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2001 1970 1980 1990 2001 1960 1970 1980 1990 2001
Argentina 65 67 70 72 74 93 94 96 97 60 52 33 25 16
Bolivia 43 46 52 58 63 58 69 78 86 166 153 112 80 60
Brazil 55 59 63 66 68 68 75 81 85 114 95 70 48 31
Chile 57 62 69 74 76 88 92 94 96 113 77 32 16 10
Colombia 57 61 66 68 72 78 84 89 92 97 70 40 30 19
Costa Rica 62 67 73 75 78 88 92 94 96 68 62 19 15 9
Dominican Republic 52 59 63 66 67 67 74 79 84 123 98 71 50 41
Ecuador 53 58 63 67 70 74 82 88 92 123 100 64 45 24
El Salvador 51 57 57 66 70 58 66 72 79 129 107 84 46 33
Guatemala 46 52 57 61 65 45 53 61 69 130 107 97 56 43
Haiti 42 48 51 52 52 22 31 40 50 179 141 132 102 79
Honduras 47 53 60 65 66 53 61 69 75 143 110 75 50 31
Mexico 57 62 67 71 73 75 82 88 91 93 73 56 36 24
Nicaragua 47 54 59 64 69 55 59 63 67 139 104 85 51 36
Paraguay 64 66 67 68 71 80 86 90 93 65 55 46 31 26
Peru 48 54 60 66 70 72 79 86 90 141 108 81 54 30
Trinidad and Tobago 64 65 68 71 72 84 88 91 94 62 52 35 18 17
Uruguay 68 69 70 73 74 93 95 97 98 50 46 37 21 14
Venezuela 60 65 68 71 74 76 84 89 93 79 53 34 25 19
Latin America 56 61 65 68 71 73 80 85 89 105 84 61 41 28






Household Population Household Population
Early 90s Current
3 Early 90s Current
3 Early 90s Current
3 Early 90s Current
3
Argentina 16 32 21 42 4 12 5 19
Bolivia 49 56 53 62 22 32 23 37
Brazil 41 30 48 38 18 10 23 13
Chile 33 17 39 21 11 5 13 6
Colombia 47 45 53 51 25 21 29 24
Costa Rica 24 19 26 20 10 8 10 8
Ecuador 56 43 62 49 23 16 26 19
Honduras 75 71 81 77 54 47 61 54
Mexico 39 32 48 39 14 9 19 13
Nicaragua 68 63 74 59 43 36 48 42
Paraguay 37 52 43 61 10 27 13 33
Uruguay 12 9 18 15 2 1 3 3
Venezuela 34 43 40 49 12 20 14 22
Latin America 41 36 48 44 18 15 23 19
Source: Eclac (2004).
1 Poor is a  household with per-capita income below the poverty line or minimum income to satisfy its essential necessities. The poverty line is
calculated with the basic necessities cost method. See Panorama Social de America Latina 2002-2003 (Eclac) for details.
2 Indigent is a household with per-capita income below the indigence line or minimum income to satisfy its essential nutritional necessities. See
Panorama Social de America Latina 2002-2003 (Eclac) for details.
3 Stands either for 2000, 2001 or 2002, depending on the country. In Chile it corresponds to 2000.-45-
Table 5
Solow’s Decomposition of LACs Economic Growth, 1960-2001
1960s
Economic Of which, contribution by:
Growth (%) ∆Labor ∆Capital ∆TFP
Top 5 6.54 2.04 3.00 1.50
Lowest 5 3.63 1.05 1.53 1.04
Difference 2.91 0.98 1.47 0.46
1970s
Economic Of which, contribution by:
Growth (%) ∆Labor ∆Capital ∆TFP
Top 5 7.78 2.02 3.70 2.06
Lowest 5 2.78 1.19 1.28 0.31
Difference 5.00 0.83 2.41 1.76
1980s
Economic Of which, contribution by:
Growth (%) ∆Labor ∆Capital ∆TFP
Top 5 3.59 1.93 2.06 -0.39
Lowest 5 -0.97 1.32 0.72 -3.02
Difference 4.56 0.60 1.33 2.63
1990s
Economic Of which, contribution by:
Growth (%) ∆Labor ∆Capital ∆TFP
Top 5 5.25 1.50 1.98 1.77
Lowest 5 1.92 1.56 1.80 -1.45
Difference 3.33 -0.06 0.18 3.22
1997-2001
Economic Of which, contribution by:
Growth (%) ∆Labor ∆Capital ∆TFP
Top 5 5.06 1.44 2.45 1.18
Lowest 5 0.58 1.26 0.84 -1.53
Difference 4.48 0.18 1.60 2.70
Source: Own elaboration.-46-
Table 6
Change in the Poverty Rate and Decomposition of the Change into Growth and
Redistribution Effects
Initial Final Percent of the change due to:
Period Poverty line Poverty rate Poverty rate Total
change
Growth Redistribution Residual
Brazil 1985-95 Extreme 10 11.1 10.2 -40 145 -5
Moderate 30.4 28 -7.9 -40 -70 10
Bolivia 1990-95 Moderate 52.4 47.1 -10.1 -147 44 3
Chile 1987-96 Moderate 45.1 23.2 -48.6 -85 -7 -8
Colombia 1991-95 Moderate 58.5 58.5 -0.1 -103 6 -3
Costa Rica 1986-95 Moderate 29.4 25.6 -12.9 -117 17 0
Peru 1985-96 Moderate 43.1 50.5 17.2 99 -27 28
Source: Attanassio and Székely (2001).
Table 7
Inflation Performance in Latin America, 1981-2003
(%, Selected countries)
1981-85 1986-1990 1991-95 1996-2000 2000 2001 2002 2003
Argentina 382.4 1191.6 53.6 -0.1 -0.9 -1.1 25.9 13.4
Bolivia 2692.4 67.8 12.0 6.3 4.6 1.6 0.9 3.3
Brazil 151.1 1076.6 1113.8 7.6 7.1 6.8 8.4 14.8
Chile 21.5 19.4 14.0 5.1 3.8 3.6 2.5 2.8
Colombia 22.4 25.1 24.7 15.6 9.2 8.0 6.3 7.1
Mexico 62.4 75.8 18.0 19.4 9.5 6.4 5.0 4.5
Paraguay 15.9 28.1 18.3 8.8 9.0 7.3 10.5 14.2
Peru 136.4 2089.1 89.5 6.3 3.7 -0.1 1.5 2.5
Uruguay 45.9 79.0 62.3 13.9 4.8 4.4 14.0 19.4
Venezuela 11.1 38.9 44.9 45.1 16.2 12.5 22.4 31.1
Latin America 105.1 292.1 162.5 10.7 6.7 6.0 9.0 10.6
  Source: IMF (2004).
Table 8
Central Government Balances in Selected Latin American Countries, 1980s-2001
(% GDP)
1980s 1990s 1991-94 1994-98 1999 2000 2001
Argentina -3.7 -1.1 -0.5 -1.2 -2.9 -2.4 -3.2
Brazil -8.7 -5.8 -4.9 -7.1 -5.8 -3.3 -3.5
Chile 0.3 1.4 1.9 1.7 -1.4 0.1 -0.3
Colombia -1.7 -2.7 -1.4 -3.2 -5.9 -6.9 -5.9
Ecuador -1.5 0.5 1.6 -0.4 -0.7 0.7 0.1
Mexico -8.5 0.0 1.9 -0.7 -1.6 -1.3 -0.7
Peru -4.3 -1.5 -1.7 0.9 -2.2 -2.0 -2.3






Institutions Voice and Political Government Regulatory Rule of Control of Ranking (2004)
Country  Index Accountability  Stability Effectiveness  Quality  Law  Corruption (155 countries)
1 FINLAND 1.94 1.70 1.63 2.01 1.93 1.99 2.39 14
2 SWITZERLAND 1.89 1.63 1.61 2.26 1.62 2.03 2.17 9
3 NETHERLANDS 1.83 1.63 1.37 2.14 1.87 1.83 2.15 19
4 NEW ZEALAND 1.80 1.60 1.35 1.97 1.69 1.91 2.28 3
5 SWEDEN 1.80 1.65 1.43 1.84 1.70 1.92 2.25 12
6 SINGAPORE 1.67 0.51 1.28 2.26 1.89 1.75 2.30 2
7 AUSTRALIA 1.65 1.50 1.18 1.84 1.64 1.85 1.91 11
8 CANADA 1.65 1.50 1.06 1.88 1.63 1.79 2.03 16
9 U.K. 1.64 1.47 0.81 2.03 1.75 1.81 1.97 7
10 AUSTRIA 1.64 1.32 1.29 1.79 1.67 1.91 1.85 20
11 GERMANY 1.58 1.51 1.06 1.76 1.59 1.73 1.82 18
12 UNITED STATES 1.39 1.32 0.34 1.70 1.51 1.70 1.77 10
13 PORTUGAL 1.31 1.31 1.43 1.03 1.47 1.30 1.33 31
14 FRANCE 1.29 1.29 0.73 1.67 1.25 1.33 1.45 44
15 CHILE 1.28 1.12 1.04 1.19 1.50 1.30 1.55 13
16 SPAIN 1.27 1.24 0.82 1.53 1.41 1.15 1.46 27
17 HONG KONG 1.16 0.15 1.03 1.44 1.50 1.30 1.52 1
18 JAPAN 1.14 0.99 1.20 1.07 0.97 1.41 1.20 38
19 ITALY 0.93 1.11 0.81 0.91 1.15 0.82 0.80 26
20 COSTA RICA 0.81 1.16 1.06 0.37 0.74 0.67 0.88 50
21 BOTSWANA 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.87 0.81 0.72 0.76 39
22 U.A.E. 0.74 -0.47 0.95 0.83 0.97 0.95 1.19 42
23 URUGUAY 0.70 0.95 0.91 0.51 0.48 0.56 0.79 39
24 S. KOREA 0.67 0.63 0.49 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.33 46
25 MALAYSIA 0.45 -0.27 0.51 0.92 0.58 0.58 0.38 87
26 SOUTH AFRICA 0.39 0.73 -0.09 0.52 0.60 0.19 0.36 53
27 TRIN. AND TOB. 0.34 0.56 0.03 0.47 0.66 0.34 -0.04 36
28 THAILAND 0.25 0.20 0.55 0.28 0.34 0.30 -0.15 60
29 MEXICO 0.13 0.33 0.22 0.15 0.49 -0.22 -0.19 63
30 BRAZIL 0.02 0.28 0.17 -0.22 0.26 -0.30 -0.05 80
31 MOROCCO -0.05 -0.30 -0.14 0.07 0.02 0.11 -0.04 66
32 SAUDI ARABIA -0.05 -1.40 0.05 -0.05 0.08 0.44 0.57 74
33 DOMINICAN REP. -0.17 0.19 0.18 -0.41 -0.17 -0.43 -0.39 120
34 EL SALVADOR -0.18 0.06 0.35 -0.53 0.04 -0.46 -0.54 24
35 INDIA -0.19 0.38 -0.84 -0.13 -0.34 0.07 -0.25 121
36 PHILIPPINES -0.22 0.17 -0.49 -0.06 0.10 -0.50 -0.52 74
37 PERU -0.22 0.22 -0.67 -0.47 0.24 -0.44 -0.20 58
38 CHINA -0.34 -1.38 0.22 0.18 -0.41 -0.22 -0.41 128
39 NICARAGUA -0.35 0.09 0.15 -0.87 -0.41 -0.63 -0.44 67
40 EGYPT -0.37 -0.87 -0.35 -0.32 -0.45 0.09 -0.29 95
41 BOLIVIA -0.38 0.01 -0.20 -0.53 -0.11 -0.60 -0.82 41
42 VIETNAM -0.48 -1.36 0.49 -0.27 -0.69 -0.39 -0.68 141
43 HONDURAS -0.49 -0.15 -0.14 -0.73 -0.37 -0.79 -0.78 121
44 GUATEMALA -0.53 -0.48 -0.43 -0.61 -0.09 -0.84 -0.71 87
45 RUSSIA -0.55 -0.52 -0.40 -0.40 -0.30 -0.78 -0.90 114
46 ARGENTINA -0.58 0.12 -0.74 -0.49 -0.84 -0.73 -0.77 116
47 ECUADOR -0.66 -0.06 -0.70 -0.96 -0.60 -0.60 -1.02 126
48 COLOMBIA -0.66 -0.55 -1.78 -0.39 -0.04 -0.75 -0.47 83
49 INDONESIA -0.84 -0.49 -1.37 -0.56 -0.68 -0.80 -1.16 136
50 VENEZUELA -0.88 -0.41 -1.20 -1.14 -0.54 -1.04 -0.94 147
51 PARAGUAY -1.01 -0.53 -1.33 -1.29 -0.56 -1.12 -1.22 106
52 NIGERIA -1.20 -0.70 -1.49 -1.12 -1.18 -1.35 -1.35 142
53 ZIMBABWE -1.34 -1.50 -1.62 -0.80 -1.61 -1.33 -1.17 153
54 HAITI -1.40 -1.11 -1.34 -1.56 -0.95 -1.76 -1.70 137



















Institutions 0.0095* 0.0101** 0.0100** 0.0095** 0.0096**
(4.14) (2.58) (2.54) (2.21) (2.25)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy variables
GDP per capita 1960 -0.0140* -0.0173* -0.0175* -0.0176* -0.0177* -0.0145* -0.0177*
(-5.75) (-7.38) (-6.74) (-6.76) (-6.66) (-5.02) (-6.71)
Average schooling years 1960 0.0089* 0.0075* 0.0074* 0.0074* 0.0070* 0.0078* 0.0071*
(4.66) (4.14) (3.94) (3.95) (3.43) (2.94) (3.35)
Openness1 0.0054** 0.0032 0.0031 0.0022 0.0027 0.0065** 0.0023
(2.38) (1.48) (1.32) (0.83) (1.08) (2.33) (0.87)
Financial development 0.0106* 0.0069* 0.0067* 0.0070* 0.0087 0.0138** 0.0083
(4.80) (3.14) (2.65) (2.75) (1.55) (2.02) (1.46)
Government consumption -0.0026 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0022 -0.0017
(-0.86) (-0.75) (-0.73) (-0.68) (-0.57) (-0.66) (-0.59)
Exchange rate overvaluation -0.0117* -0.0114* -0.0114* -0.0112* -0.0109** -0.0107** -0.0109**
(-2.70) (-2.87) (-2.87) (-2.81) (-2.56) (-2.20) (-2.61)
Instruments:
Constructed trade share (Frankel and
Romer)
No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Legal origin No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
English
No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Fraction of the population speaking one
of the major languages of Western
Europe
No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Distance from Equator of capital city. No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.66 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.64 0.73
Number of observations 79 77 77 77 77 78 77
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level
**Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 10% level-49-
Table 11
Growth Volatility Estimates
Dependent Variable: Std. Deviation of















Institutions -0.0095* -0.0089* -0.0087* -0.0141** -0.0153**
(-3.96) (-2.79) (-2.73) (-2.55) (-2.40)
Others Controls:
Policy variables
Financial development -0.0081* -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0021 0.0071 -0.0095*** 0.0080
(-3.75) (-0.41) (-0.49) (-0.68) (0.90) (-1.73) (0.90)
Government consumption 0.0035 0.0019 0.0020 0.0014 0.0050 0.0026 0.0039
(0.88) (0.51) (0.54) (0.38) (1.06) (0.44) (0.83)
Exchange rate overvaluation 0.0212* 0.0188* 0.0189* 0.0185* 0.0206* 0.0199* 0.0197*
(4.10) (3.89) (3.90) (3.79) (3.85) (3.31) (3.60)
Openness1 0.0004 0.0012 0.0011 0.0031 -0.0004 0.0009 0.0060
(0.12) (0.39) (0.36) (0.85) (-0.12) (0.23) (1.28)
Instruments:
Constructed trade share (Frankel and
Romer)
No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Legal origin No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
English
No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
one of the major languages of Western
Europe
No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Distance from Equator of capital city. No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.42 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.46 0.41 0.42
Number of observations 80 78 78 78 78 79 78
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level
**Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 10% level-50-
Table 12
Effect on Per-capita GDP Growth of Having Institutions like Chile’s, the Major







Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max.
Chile 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.7% 1.0%
Argentina 1.0% 1.9% 2.7% 1.1% 2.0% 2.8% 1.4% 2.5% 3.7%
Bolivia 0.9% 1.7% 2.4% 1.0% 1.8% 2.6% 1.3% 2.3% 3.4%
Brazil 0.7% 1.3% 1.8% 0.8% 1.4% 2.0% 1.1% 1.9% 2.8%
Colombia 1.1% 2.0% 2.8% 1.1% 2.1% 3.0% 1.5% 2.6% 3.8%
Costa Rica 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 0.3% 0.6% 0.8% 0.6% 1.1% 1.6%
Dominican Republic 0.8% 1.5% 2.1% 0.9% 1.6% 2.3% 1.2% 2.1% 3.1%
Ecuador 1.1% 2.0% 2.8% 1.1% 2.1% 3.0% 1.5% 2.6% 3.8%
El Salvador 0.8% 1.5% 2.1% 0.9% 1.6% 2.3% 1.2% 2.1% 3.1%
Guatemala 1.0% 1.8% 2.6% 1.1% 1.9% 2.8% 1.4% 2.5% 3.6%
Haiti 1.5% 2.7% 3.9% 1.6% 2.8% 4.1% 1.9% 3.4% 4.9%
Honduras 1.0% 1.8% 2.6% 1.1% 1.9% 2.7% 1.4% 2.5% 3.6%
Jamaica 0.7% 1.3% 1.9% 0.8% 1.4% 2.0% 1.1% 2.0% 2.9%
Mexico 0.6% 1.2% 1.7% 0.7% 1.3% 1.8% 1.0% 1.8% 2.6%
Nicaragua 0.9% 1.7% 2.4% 1.0% 1.7% 2.5% 1.3% 2.3% 3.3%
Paraguay 1.3% 2.3% 3.3% 1.3% 2.4% 3.5% 1.7% 3.0% 4.3%
Peru 0.8% 1.5% 2.2% 0.9% 1.6% 2.3% 1.2% 2.2% 3.2%
Trinidad y Tobago 0.5% 1.0% 1.4% 0.6% 1.0% 1.5% 0.9% 1.6% 2.3%
Uruguay 0.3% 0.6% 0.9% 0.4% 0.7% 1.0% 0.7% 1.3% 1.8%
Venezuela 1.2% 2.2% 3.2% 1.3% 2.3% 3.3% 1.6% 2.9% 4.1%
Simple average excluding Chile 0.9% 1.6% 2.3% 0.9% 1.7% 2.4% 1.3% 2.3% 3.3%
Simple average including Chile 0.8% 1.5% 2.2% 0.9% 1.6% 2.3% 1.2% 2.2% 3.1%
Weighted average excluding Chile 0.8% 1.4% 2.0% 0.8% 1.5% 2.1% 1.1% 2.1% 3.0%
Weighted average including Chile 0.7% 1.3% 1.9% 0.8% 1.4% 2.1% 1.1% 2.0% 2.9%
Notes: (1) Weighted averages are constructed using each country’s GDP as weights. (2) Min and Max are
calculated using the average coefficient plus/minus one time the average standard deviation.
Source: Own elaboration.-51-
Table 13
Effect on Per-capita GDP Growth of Having Financial Development like Chile’s, the







Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max.
Chile 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.6% 0.9%
Argentina 0.4% 0.9% 1.3% 0.6% 1.1% 1.7% 0.7% 1.5% 2.2%
Bolivia 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7% 0.4% 0.8% 1.2%
Brazil 0.3% 0.6% 0.8% 0.4% 0.8% 1.3% 0.6% 1.2% 1.7%
Colombia 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 0.5% 1.1% 1.6% 0.7% 1.4% 2.1%
Costa Rica 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 0.5% 1.1% 1.6% 0.7% 1.4% 2.1%
Dominican Republic 0.3% 0.6% 0.9% 0.5% 0.9% 1.3% 0.6% 1.2% 1.8%
Ecuador 0.3% 0.6% 0.9% 0.5% 0.9% 1.3% 0.6% 1.2% 1.8%
El Salvador 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 1.2% 2.3% 3.5% 1.3% 2.6% 3.9%
Guatemala 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 0.6% 1.3% 1.9% 0.8% 1.6% 2.4%
Haiti 0.6% 1.2% 1.8% 0.7% 1.5% 2.2% 0.9% 1.8% 2.7%
Honduras 0.2% 0.5% 0.7% 0.4% 0.7% 1.1% 0.5% 1.1% 1.6%
Jamaica 0.5% 0.9% 1.4% 0.6% 1.2% 1.8% 0.8% 1.5% 2.3%
Mexico 0.7% 1.4% 2.0% 0.8% 1.6% 2.4% 1.0% 2.0% 2.9%
Paraguay 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 0.5% 1.1% 1.6% 0.7% 1.4% 2.1%
Peru 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 0.5% 1.1% 1.6% 0.7% 1.4% 2.1%
Trinidad and Tobago 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 0.4% 0.7% 1.1% 0.5% 1.0% 1.6%
Uruguay 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.5% 0.8% 0.4% 0.8% 1.3%
Venezuela 0.7% 1.4% 2.1% 0.8% 1.7% 2.5% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0%
Simple average excluding Chile 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 0.6% 1.1% 1.7% 0.7% 1.4% 2.1%
Simple average including Chile 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 0.5% 1.1% 1.6% 0.7% 1.4% 2.1%
Weighted average excluding Chile 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 0.6% 1.3% 1.9% 0.8% 1.6% 2.4%
Weighted average including Chile 0.5% 0.9% 1.4% 0.6% 1.2% 1.8% 0.8% 1.5% 2.3%
Notes: (1) Weighted averages are constructed using each country’s GDP as weights. (2) Min and Max are calculated
using the average coefficient plus/minus one time the average standard deviation.
Source: Own elaboration.-52-
Table 14




Chile 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Argentina 0.2% 0.4% 0.5%
Bolivia 0.3% 0.5% 0.6%
Brazil 0.1% 0.2% 0.3%
Colombia -0.1% -0.1% -0.2%
Costa Rica 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Dominican Republic 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
Ecuador 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
El Salvador 0.3% 0.5% 0.6%
Haiti 0.2% 0.4% 0.5%
Honduras 0.2% 0.3% 0.4%
Jamaica 0.2% 0.2% 0.3%
Mexico 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Paraguay 0.2% 0.3% 0.3%
Peru 0.4% 0.6% 0.8%
Trinidad and Tobago 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Uruguay 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Venezuela -0.1%       -0.1% -0.1%
Simple average excluding Chile 0.1% 0.2% 0.3%
Simple average including Chile 0.1% 0.2% 0.3%
Weighted average excluding Chile 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Weighted average including Chile 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Notes: (1) Weighted averages are constructed using each country’s GDP
as weights. (2) Min and Max are calculated using the average coefficient
plus/minus one time the average standard deviation.
Source: Own elaboration.-53-
Table 15
Difference in Growth performance:
Chile v/s Latin America and East Asia v/s Latin America
(1990-2000)
Chile v/s Latin America East Asia* v/s Latin America
 (1990-2000)  (1990-2000)
Simple Average Weighted Average Simple Average Weighted Average
Countries Countries Countries Countries
Inicial GDP -0.5% 0.2% -0.5% 0.0%
Human Capital 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Quality of Institutions 1.2% 1.1% 0.4% 0.3%
Financial Development 0.8% 0.7% 0.9% 1.1%
Exchange Rate Overvaluation 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.2%
Predicted Difference 2.2% 2.6% 1.5% 1.7%
Actual Difference 3.5% 3.3% 1.7% 2.0%
* East Asia countries include Singapore, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.
Note: Weighted average is constructed using each country’s GDP as weights.
Source: Own elaboration.-54-
Table 16
Effect on the Volatility of Per-capita GDP of Having Institutions like Chile’s, the Major







Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max.
Chile 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.5% -0.7% -1.0%
Argentina -1.3% -2.0% -2.7% -1.4% -2.1% -2.8% -1.8% -2.7% -3.7%
Bolivia -1.2% -1.8% -2.4% -1.2% -1.9% -2.5% -1.6% -2.5% -3.4%
Brazil -0.9% -1.4% -1.8% -1.0% -1.5% -2.0% -1.4% -2.1% -2.8%
Colombia -1.4% -2.1% -2.8% -1.4% -2.2% -3.0% -1.8% -2.8% -3.8%
Costa Rica -0.3% -0.5% -0.7% -0.4% -0.6% -0.8% -0.8% -1.2% -1.6%
Dominican Republic -1.0% -1.6% -2.1% -1.1% -1.7% -2.2% -1.5% -2.3% -3.1%
Ecuador -1.4% -2.1% -2.8% -1.4% -2.2% -2.9% -1.8% -2.8% -3.8%
El Salvador -1.0% -1.6% -2.1% -1.1% -1.7% -2.3% -1.5% -2.3% -3.1%
Guatemala -1.3% -2.0% -2.6% -1.3% -2.0% -2.8% -1.7% -2.7% -3.6%
Haití -1.9% -2.9% -3.9% -2.0% -3.0% -4.0% -2.4% -3.6% -4.9%
Honduras -1.3% -1.9% -2.6% -1.3% -2.0% -2.7% -1.7% -2.6% -3.5%
Jamaica -0.9% -1.4% -1.9% -1.0% -1.5% -2.0% -1.4% -2.1% -2.9%
Mexico -0.8% -1.2% -1.7% -0.9% -1.3% -1.8% -1.3% -2.0% -2.6%
Nicaragua -1.2% -1.8% -2.4% -1.2% -1.9% -2.5% -1.6% -2.5% -3.3%
Paraguay -1.6% -2.5% -3.3% -1.7% -2.6% -3.5% -2.1% -3.2% -4.3%
Peru -1.1% -1.6% -2.2% -1.1% -1.7% -2.3% -1.5% -2.3% -3.1%
Trinidad y Tobago -0.7% -1.0% -1.4% -0.7% -1.1% -1.5% -1.1% -1.7% -2.3%
Uruguay -0.4% -0.6% -0.8% -0.5% -0.7% -1.0% -0.9% -1.3% -1.8%
Venezuela -1.5% -2.3% -3.1% -1.6% -2.4% -3.3% -2.0% -3.0% -4.1%
Simple average excluding Chile -1.1% -1.7% -2.3% -1.2% -1.8% -2.4% -1.6% -2.4% -3.2%
Simple average including Chile -1.1% -1.6% -2.2% -1.1% -1.7% -2.3% -1.5% -2.3% -3.1%
Weighted average excluding Chile -1.0% -1.5% -2.0% -1.0% -1.6% -2.1% -1.4% -2.2% -3.0%
Weighted average including Chile -0.9% -1.4% -1.9% -1.0% -1.5% -2.0% -1.4% -2.1% -2.9%
Notes: (1) Weighted averages are constructed using each country’s GDP as weights. (2) Min and Max are
calculated using the average coefficient plus/minus one time the average standard deviation.
Source: Own elaboration.-55-
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Chile 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Argentina -0.5% -0.6% -0.8%
Bolivia -0.6% -0.8% -1.0%
Brazil -0.3% -0.4% -0.5%
Colombia 0.2% 0.2% 0.3%
Costa Rica 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
Dominican Republic -0.2% -0.3% -0.4%
Ecuador -0.1% -0.1% -0.1%
El Salvador -0.6% -0.8% -1.0%
Haiti -0.5% -0.6% -0.8%
Honduras -0.4% -0.5% -0.7%
Jamaica -0.3% -0.4% -0.5%
Mexico  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Paraguay -0.3% -0.4% -0.5%
Peru -0.8% -1.0% -1.3%
Trinidad and Tobago -0.2% -0.3% -0.3%
Uruguay -0.2% -0.2% -0.3%
Venezuela 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Simple average excluding Chile -0.3% -0.4% -0.5%
Simple average including Chile -0.3% -0.3% -0.4%
Weighted average excluding Chile -0.2% -0.2% -0.3%
Weighted average including Chile -0.1% -0.2% -0.3%
Notes: (1) Weighted averages are constructed using each country’s GDP as weights.





Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Description Source
Growth rate of GDP per capita Annual GDP growth rate minus population growth rate, 1960-2000 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002  and  Penn World
Tables.
Standard deviation of growth Standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate, 1960-2000 Own elaboration
GDP per capita 1960 Logarithm of GDP per capita, on Purchasing Power Parity Basis, in 1960 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002
Average schooling years 1960 Logarithm of average years of schooling in 1960 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002
Openness1 Logarithm of sum of exports and import of goods and services as
percentage of GDP, 1960-2000
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002
Openness2 Residual of regression of volume of trade over GDP on country size and
dummy for oil exports, 1960-2000
Own elaboration
Financial development Logarithm of credit to private sector over GDP, 1960-2000 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt y Levine (2003)
Government consumption Logarithm of government consumption over GDP, 1960-2000 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002
Government Consumption Vol. Standard deviation of government consumption, 1960-2000 Own elaboration
Exchange rate overvaluation Logarithm of real exchange rate overvaluation index, 1960-2000 Easterly and Levine (2003) using the methology of Dollar (1992)
Exchange rate overvaluation Vol Standard deviation of exchange rate overvaluation index, 1960-2000 Own elaboration
Black market premium Black market premium on foreign exchange, 1960-2000 Easterly and Levine (2003)
Terms of trade growth Annual growth of terms of trade, 1960-2000 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002
Terms of trade volatility Standard deviation of terms of trade, 1960-2000 Own elaboration
Inflation Logarithm of annual inflation, 1960-2000 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002
Inflation Volatility Standard deviation of inflation rate, 1960-2000 Own elaboration
Landlock Dummy variable taking value 1 for countries without access to the sea, 0
otherwise
Gallup and Sachs (1998)
Lnd100 Proportion of land area within 100 km of the seacoast Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999)
Constructed trade share (Frankel and Romer) Logarithm of predicted trade shares computed from a bilateral trade
equation with "pure geography" variables
Frankel and Romer (1999)
Legal origin Dummy variable for legal origin of laws: German, French, Scandinavian,
Socialist or English
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny (1999)
Ethnolinguistic fraction Ethnolinguistic fraction of the population La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny (1999)
Fraction of the population speaking English Fraction of the population speaking English Hall and Jones (1999)
Fraction of the population speaking one of major
languages of Western Europe
Fraction of the population speaking one of major languages of Western
Europe
Hall and Jones (1999)
Distance from Equator of the capital city Distance from Equator of capital city La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny (1999)-57-
Table A.2
Robustness Check: 2SLS Estimation Instrumentalizing Institutions.
Dependent Variable:
GDP per capita Growth (PPP)
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Institutions 0.0100** 0.0104** 0.0100** 0.0099** 0.0110** 0.0091**
(2.56) (2.42) (2.35) (2.25) (2.49) (2.28)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy variables
GDP per capita 1960 -0.0175* -0.0174* -0.0174* -0.0171* -0.0174* -0.0188*
(-6.73) (-6.39) (-6.33) (-5.97) (-6.54) (-7.38)
Average schooling years 1960 0.0076* 0.0075* 0.0075* 0.0071* 0.0074* 0.0092*
(4.11) (4.06) (3.65) (3.38) (3.99) (5.07)
Openness1 0.0029 0.0026 0.0027 0.0024 0.0023 0.0023
(1.28) (1.11) (1.04) (0.86) (1.00) (0.97)
Openness2
Financial development 0.0070* 0.0067** 0.0072* 0.0068** 0.0070* 0.0083*
(2.78) (2.56) (2.81) (2.54) (2.77) (3.43)
Government consumption -0.0025
(-0.82)
Exchange rate overvaluation -0.0113* -0.0113* -0.0125** -0.0121** -0.0129*
(-2.86) (-2.83) (-2.65) (-2.54) (-3.08)
Black market premium 0.0019 0.00178
(0.58) (0.51)
Term of trade growth 0.05525 0.0257
(0.69) (0.30)










Constructed trade share (Frankel and
Romer)
No No No No No No
Legal origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
English
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking one
of the major languages of Western
Europe
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Equator of Capital City. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.72 0.71
Number of observations 77 76 73 72 76 81
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 10% level-58-
Dependent Variable:
GDP per capita Growth (PPP)
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Institutions 0.0100** 0.0098** 0.0093** 0.0103** 0.0096**
(2.50) (1.96) (2.32) (2.48) (2.09)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy
variables
GDP per capita 1960 -0.0178* -0.0171* -0.0175* -0.0177* -0.0179*
(-7.06) (-6.10) (-6.52) (-6.49) (-6.66)
Average schooling years 1960 0.0075* 0.0073* 0.0077* 0.0059** 0.0062*




Financial development 0.0077* 0.0069** 0.0076* 0.0061** 0.0071**
(2.94) (2.32) (2.89) (2.31) (2.61)
Government consumption
Exchange rate overvaluation -0.0110* -0.0109** -0.0104** -0.0109** -0.0105**
(-2.83) (-2.61) (-2.58) (-2.56) (-2.49)
Black market premium
Term of trade growth




















Constructed trade share (Frankel and
Romer)
No No No No No
Legal origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
English
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
one of the major languages of Western
Europe
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Equator of Capital
City.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.73
Number of observations 79 73 75 77 79
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 10% level-59-
Table A.3
Robustness Check: 2SLS Estimation Instrumentalizing Institutions, Openness and
Financial Development
Dependent Variable:
GDP per capita Growth (PPP)
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Institutions 0.0094** 0.0098** 0.0100** 0.0106** 0.0107** 0.0092**
(2.23) (2.13) (2.07) (2.04) (2.30) (2.12)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy
variables
GDP per capita 1960 -0.0177* -0.0175* -0.0177* -0.0175* -0.0175* -0.0188*
(-6.70) (3.41) (-6.36) (-5.99) (-6.45) (-7.36)
Average schooling years 1960 0.0073* 0.0073* 0.0075* 0.0074* 0.0073* 0.0093*
(3.43) (3.41) (3.19) (3.07) (3.40) (3.98)
Openness1 0.0024 0.0018 0.0014 -0.002 0.0015 0.0020
(0.88) (0.64) (0.42) (-0.05) (0.54) (0.70)
Openness2
Financial development 0.0086 0.0082 0.0076 0.0058 0.0079 0.0080
(1.56) (1.45) (1.29) (0.90) (1.41) (1.48)
Government consumption -0.0023
(-0.74)
Exchange rate overvaluation -0.0108** -0.0108** -0.0119** -0.0114** -0.0125*
(-2.61) (-2.58) (-2.49) (-2.33) (-2.91)
Black market premium 0.0018 0.0016
(0.55) (0.46)
Term of trade growth 0.0467 0.0232
(0.58) (0.26)












Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population
speaking English
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population
speaking one of the major
languages of Western Europe
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Equator of
Capital City.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.72 0.71
Number of observations 77 76 73 72 76 81
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 10% level-60-
Dependent Variable:
GDP per capita Growth (PPP)
(25) (26) (27) (28) (29)
Institutions 0.0098** 0.0096*** 0.0095** 0.0097** 0.0096**
(2.29) (1.87) (2.16) (2.06) (2.16)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy
variables
GDP per capita 1960 -0.0178* -0.0175* -0.0174* -0.0178* -0.0181*
(-6.96) (-6.10) (-6.43) (-6.05) (-6.06)
Average schooling years 1960 0.0073* 0.0072* 0.0079* 0.0063** 0.0058**




Financial development 0.0085 0.0078 0.0068 0.0065 0.0083
(1.50) (1.54) (1.10) (0.98) (1.23)
Government consumption
Exchange rate overvaluation -0.0108* -0.0104** -0.0106** -0.0105** -0.0106**
(-2.67) (-2.42) (-2.54) (-2.48) (-2.47)
Black market premium
Term of trade growth




















Constructed trade share (Frankel and
Romer)
No Yes Yes No Yes
Legal origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
English
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
one of the major languages of Western
Europe
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Equator of Capital
City.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.74
Number of observations 79 73 75 79 77
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 10% level-61-
Table A.4
Robustness Check: 2SLS Estimation Instrumentalizing Institutions, Openness and
Financial Development, with Different combinations of Instruments and Changing the
Definition of Openness
Dependent Variable:
GDP per capita Growth (PPP)
(30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35)
Institutions 0.0101** 0.0114* 0.0105* 0.0092** 0.0112** 0.0118**
(2.59) (2.83) (2.69) (2.14) (2.25) (2.12)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy
variables
GDP per capita 1960 -0.0173* -0.0175* -0.0185* -0.0177* -0.0181* -0.0189*
(-6.32) (-6.16) (-6.33) (-6.68) (-6.74) (-5.86)
Average schooling years 1960 0.0069* 0.0071* 0.0087* 0.0070* 0.0072* 0.0066*
(3.46) (3.46) (4.00) (3.27) (3.34) (2.69)
Openness1 0.0026 0.0020 0.0012
(0.94) (0.71) (0.37)
Openness2 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0009
(-0.57) (-0.43) (-0.19)
Financial development 0.0075 0.0056 0.0065 0.0090 0.0065 0.0090
(1.48) (1.02) (1.31) (1.58) (0.98) (1.56)
Government consumption -0.0016 -0.0018 0.000
(-0.56) (-0.63) (0.0)
Exchange rate overvaluation -0.0105** -0.0108* -0.0107** -0.0112* -0.0104**
(-2.60) (-2.67) (-2.55) (-2.65) (-2.40)
Black market premium
Term of trade growth











No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population
speaking English
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Fraction of the population
speaking one of the major
languages of Western Europe
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Distance from Equator of
Capital City.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.73 0.73 0.72
Number of observations 76 76 79 77 77 77
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 10% level-62-
Dependent Variable:
GDP per capita Growth (PPP)
(36) (37) (38) (39) (40)
Institutions 0.0091** 0.0108** 0.0110** 0.0110*** 0.0115**
(2.12) (2.00) (2.20) (1.93) (2.48)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy
variables
GDP per capita 1960 -0.0177* -0.0192* -0.0180* -0.0165* -0.0181*
(-6.67) (-6.85) (-6.71) (-4.87) (-7.04)
Average schooling years 1960 0.0072* 0.0089* 0.0073* 0.0096* 0.0074*




Financial development 0.0094*** 0.0074 0.0065 0.0065
(1.68) (1.21) (0.97) (1.03)
Government consumption -0.0018
(0.69)
Exchange rate overvaluation -0.0107** -0.0113* -0.0111*
(-2.56) (-2.66) (-2.73)
Black market premium
Term of trade growth









Constructed trade share (Frankel and
Romer)
Yes No Yes No No
Legal origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
English
No No Yes No No
Fraction of the population speaking
one of the major languages of Western
Europe
Y e s N oN oN oN o
Distance from Equator of Capital
City.
Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.72 0.70 0.73 0.65 0.72
Number of observations 77 84 77 83 79
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 10% level-63-
Table A.5
Robustness Check: 2SLS Estimation Instrumentalizing Institutions.
Depend Variable: Std. Deviation of
GDP per capita Growth
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Institutions -0.0093* -0.0086** -0.0084** -0.0092*** -0.0091* -0.0088**
(-2.96) (-2.55) (-2.44) (-1.74) (-2.85) (-2.62)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy
variables
GDP per capita 1960 0.0010
(0.29)
Financial development -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0030 -0.0011 -0.0015
(-0.58) (-0.56) (-0.52) (-0.89) (-0.36) (-0.48)
Government consumption 0.0011 0.0024
(0.28) (0.65)
Exchange rate overvaluation 0.0189* 0.0177* 0.0181* 0.0174* 0.0191* 0.0179*
(3.76) (3.48) (3.39) (3.17) (4.02) (3.58)
Inflation -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0000
(-0.10) (-0.19) (-0.03)
Openness1 0.0015 0.0006 0.0002 0.0019
(0.47) (0.20) (0.07) (0.53)
Openness2







Constructed trade share (Frankel and
Romer)
No No No No No No
Legal origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
English
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
one of the major languages of Western
Europe
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Equator of capital city. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.53
Number of observations 78 75 75 72 78 75
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 10% level-64-
Depend Variable: Std. Deviation of
GDP per capita Growth
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Institutions -0.0102* -0.0088* -0.0107** -0.0092* -0.0088* -0.0098* -0.0101*
(-5.56) (-3.72) (-2.13) (-4.39) (-3.94) (-3.86) (-5.68)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy
variables
GDP per capita 1960
Financial development
Government consumption 0.0012 -0.0024 0.0013 0.0013
(0.33) (-0.13) (0.36) (0.33)
Exchange rate overvaluation 0.0183* 0.0171* 0.0186* 0.0173* 0.0173* 0.0186*






Term of Trade Volatility 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002***






Constructed trade share (Frankel and
Romer)
No No No No No No No
Legal origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
English
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
one of the major languages of Western
Europe
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Equator of capital city. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.40 0.51
Number of observations 80 77 80 77 77 84 80
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 10% level-65-
Table A.6
Robustness Check: 2SLS Estimation Instrumentalizing Institutions, Openness and
Financial Development.
Depend Variable: Std. Deviation of
GDP per capita Growth
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25)
Institutions -0.0164** -0.0154** -0.0132*** -0.0100* -0.0093*
(-2.38) (-2.30) (-1.92) (-4.73) (-4.33)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy
variables
GDP per capita 1960 -0.0017
(-0.36)
Financial development 0.0085 0.0078 0.0069
(0.86) (0.92) (0.69)
Government consumption 0.0029 0.0014
(0.60) (0.37)
Exchange rate overvaluation 0.0177* 0.0178* 0.0181* 0.0178* 0.0163*
(3.06) (3.10) (2.83) (3.72) (3.25)
Inflation 0.0018 0.0018
(0.84) (0.83)
Openness1 0.0088 0.0068 0.0088 0.0040 0.0039
(1.41) (1.27) (1.54) (1.05) (0.98)
Openness2







Constructed trade share (Frankel and
Romer)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
English
Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
one of the major languages of Western
Europe
Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Distance from Equator of capital city. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.38 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.50
Number of observations 78 75 72 80 77
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 10% level-66-
Depend Variable: Std. Deviation of
GDP per capita Growth
(26) (27) (28) (29) (30)
Institutions -0.0143** -0.0091 -0.0093* -0.0094* -0.0092*
(-2.49) (-3.84) (-4.28) (-4.16) (-4.34)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy
variables
GDP per capita 1960
Financial development 0.0074
(0.90)
Government consumption 0.0050 0.0003
(1.16) (0.08)
Exchange rate overvaluation 0.0206* 0.0157* 0.0180* 0.0186*






Term of Trade Volatility 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0001
(1.25) (1.33) (1.72) (1.23)
Government Consumption Volatility -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0001
(-0.57) (0.98) (-0.19)







Constructed trade share (Frankel and
Romer)
No Yes Yes No No
Legal origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
English
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
one of the major languages of Western
Europe
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Equator of capital city. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.51
Number of observations 78 77 77 77 77
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 10% level-67-
Table A.7
Robustness Check: 2SLS Estimation Instrumentalizing Institutions, Openness and
Financial Development, Different combinations of Instruments and Changing the
Definition of Openness
Depend Variable: Std. Deviation of
GDP per capita Growth
(31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
Institutions -0.0108* -0.0120** -0.0101* -0.0100* -0.0095* -0.0144**
(-5.95) (-2.29) (-5.40) (-4.74) (-4.23) (-2.00)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy
variables
GDP per capita 1960
Financial development 0.0025 0.0067
(0.34) (0.70)
Government consumption 0.0014 0.0018 0.0037
(0.37) (0.46) (0.80)
Exchange rate overvaluation 0.0196* 0.020* 0.0193* 0.0178* 0.0181* 0.0197*
(4.21) (4.01) (4.04) (3.73) (3.76) (3.66)
Inflation
Openness1 0.0039 0.0039 0.0055
(1.00) (1.01) (1.16)
Openness2 -0.0038 0.0019 0.0009
(-1.32) (0.31) (0.17)






Constructed trade share (Frankel and
Romer)
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
English
Yes Yes Yes No No No
Fraction of the population speaking
one of the major languages of Western
Europe
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Distance from Equator of capital city. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.52 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.44
Number of observations 77 75 77 80 80 78
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 10% level-68-
Depend Variable: Std. Deviation of
GDP per capita Growth
(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42)
Institutions -0.0099* -0.0161*** -0.0097** -0.0143*** -0.0097* -0.0105**
(-4.28) (-1.95) (-2.28) (-1.95) (-5.14) (-2.63)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy
variables
GDP per capita 1960
Financial development 0.0078 0.0073
(0.77) (0.74)
Government consumption 0.0013 0.0030 0.0014 0.0043
(0.35) (0.52) (0.28) (0.83)
Exchange rate overvaluation 0.0178* 0.0191* 0.0178* 0.0201* 0.0190* 0.0184*
(3.67) (3.12) (3.30) (3.54) (4.08) (3.51)
Inflation
Openness1 0.0047 0.0067 0.0054 0.0054
(1.16) (1.22) (1.12) (1.13)
Openness2






Constructed trade share (Frankel and
Romer)
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Legal origin Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Etnolinguistic fraction No No No Yes Yes No
Fraction of the population speaking
English
No No Yes No No Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
one of the major languages of Western
Europe
No No Yes No No Yes
Distance from Equator of capital city. Yes No No No Yes No
R-squared 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.51
Number of observations 80 78 80 78 80 80
Note: T tests are in brackets
*Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 10% level-69-
Table A.8
Economic Growth and Growth Volatility Estimates
(Sample 1996-2000)
Dependent Variable:
GDP per capita Growth (PPP) and Std.

























Institutions 0.0270* 0.0243** -0.0192* -0.0132**
(3.15) (2.45) (-3.26) (-2.23)
Others Controls:
Initial conditions and policy variables
GDP per capita  (1996) -0.0144*** -0.0155***
(-1.85) (-1.81)
Average schooling years  (1996) 0.0037 0.0121
(0.45) (1.38)
Openness1 0.0022 0.0019 0.0029 0.0013
(0.39) (0.34) (0.64) (0.27)
Financial development 0.0028 0.0015 0.0051 0.0048
(0.26) (0.14) (1.25) (1.27)
Government consumption -0.0113 -0.0087 0.0112 -0.0032
(-1.42) (-0.97) (1.51) (-0.35)
Exchange rate overvaluation -0.0089 -0.0030 -0.0032 -0.0024
(-1.54) (-0.49) (-0.60) (-0.45)
Instruments:
Constructed trade share (Frankel and
Romer)
Yes Yes No No
Legal origin Yes Yes Yes Yes
Etnolinguistic fraction Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking
English
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fraction of the population speaking one
of the major languages of Western
Europe
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Equator of capital city. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.29 0.37 0.10 0.14
Number of observations 92 77 95 78
Notes: (1) T tests are in brackets. (2) Columns 1 and 3 use a larger sample than in previous regressions
because of greater data availability resulting from the shorter sample period. Columns 2 and 4 use
exactly the same sample than in the 1960-2000 regressions.
*Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 10% level.Documentos de Trabajo
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